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ABANDONING COPYRIGHT
Dave Fagundes* & Aaron Perzanowski**
For nearly two hundred years, U.S. copyright law has assumed that owners
may voluntarily abandon their rights in a work. But scholars have largely
ignored copyright abandonment, and the case law is fragmented and
inconsistent. As a result, abandonment remains poorly theorized, owners can
avail themselves of no reliable mechanism to abandon their works, and the
practice remains rare. This Article seeks to bring copyright abandonment
out of the shadows, showing that it is a doctrine rich in conceptual,
normative, and practical significance. Unlike abandonment of real and
chattel property, which imposes significant public costs in exchange for
discrete private benefits, copyright abandonment is potentially costly for
rights holders but broadly beneficial for society. Nonetheless, rights
holders—ranging from lauded filmmakers and photographers to leading
museums and everyday creators—make the counterintuitive choice to
abandon valuable works. This Article analyzes two previously untapped
resources to better understand copyright abandonment. First, we survey four
decades U.S. Copyright Office records, demonstrating both the motivations
for abandonment and the infrequency of the practice. Second, we examine
every state and federal copyright abandonment case, a corpus of nearly 300
decisions. By distilling this body of law, this Article distinguishes
abandonment from a set of related doctrines and reveals the major fault lines
in judicial application of the abandonment standard. Finally, we highlight
the potential of abandonment to further copyright’s constitutional aims by
suggesting a series of reforms designed to better align copyright holder
incentives with the public good.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright vests automatically, whether authors want it or not.
The author of an original work is a copyright holder from the instant
that work is fixed in some durable form.1 But what if you don’t want
to own a copyright in the photo you just took or the song you just
wrote?2 Or what if, for reasons of personal gain or pure altruism, you
want to abandon your existing copyright and place your work in the
public domain?
In theory, copyright owners, like owners of chattel property,
may abandon their works.3 In fact, copyright law borrowed its legal
test for abandonment from common-law property doctrine. In practice
though, it remains far from clear how an author can actually relinquish
rights in a work. The Copyright Act makes no mention of
abandonment, and there is no standard form to file with the Copyright
Office. In light of this, courts have been understandably conflicted
about what acts reflect an intent to abandon. And even if the law did
offer a clear pathway for authors to abandon their copyrights, there is
no single, definitive registry of abandoned works for would-be users
to consult.4
The uncertainty surrounding these elementary questions of
copyright ownership is problematic, in part, because it frustrates
abandonment’s potential to enrich the increasingly starved public
domain. Copyright’s constitutional lodestar—promoting the progress
1

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
Aside from works created by the federal government or those that fail copyright’s
minimal eligibility standards, there is no mechanism under current U.S. law to
prevent copyright from vesting as an initial matter. See id. § 105.
3
We focus here on U.S. copyright law. But there is considerable variation among
jurisdictions on the question of copyright abandonment. Under United Kingdom
law, the availability of abandonment is far from clear, and statements purporting to
abandon copyright may be interpreted as mere revocable licenses. See Phillip
Johnson, ‘Dedicating’ Copyright to the Public Domain, 71 MOD. L. REV. 587, 5968 (2008). And German courts have rejected the idea of abandonment. See GRAHAM
GREENLEAF & DAVID LINDSAY, PUBLIC RIGHTS: COPYRIGHT’S PUBLIC DOMAINS
512 (2018) (citing Berlin Wall Pictures, Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof
BGH) Feb. 23, (1995) GRUR 673, (1997) 28 IIC 282). Other jurisdictions—Chile,
Colombia, India, and Kenya among them—expressly recognize abandonment. See
Andres Guadamuz, Comparative Analysis of National Approaches on Voluntary
Copyright Relinquishment, WIPO COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014).
4
Cf. Robert Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the
Digital Era, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113 (2011) (reflecting on the surprising
difficulty of abandoning copyrights).
2
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of science—presumes a healthy balance between privately owned
works and publicly available material. But after decades of
unremittingly copyright-holder-friendly reforms, this balance has
tipped significantly toward private rights at the expense of the public.
Legislation extending the term of copyright and eliminating formal
requirements for protection has slowed to a trickle the flow of works
into the public domain. In light of these trends, an invigorated
abandonment doctrine promises a voluntary means to replenish the
desiccated public domain well before statutory expiration of
copyright.
The desire among authors to part with their copyrights in order
to enrich the public domain is not merely theoretical. Rights holders
have attempted to abandon their rights in millions of photos, including
hundreds of thousands from the Metropolitan Museum of Art alone.
Acclaimed photographer Carol Highmsith sought to abandon her
rights in tens of thousands of images donated to the Library of
Congress. Likewise, award-winning filmmaker Nina Paley expressed
her desire to place her film Sita Sings the Blues in the public domain.
And more than 100,000 software projects hosted on GitHub indicate
the developers’ intention to abandon copyright. Other times,
abandonment arises as a defense, as when InfoWars claimed it did not
infringe Matt Furie’s “Pepe the Frog” because Furie’s public
statements indicated that he had abandoned the character.5 Given the
state of the law, however, whether these owners actually have
abandoned their copyrights remains unclear.
The disarray pervading the law and practice of copyright
abandonment has not inspired much scholarly examination.6 This is
5

InfoWars eventually paid Furie $15m to settle the suit as a jury trial loomed,
suggesting that InfoWars’ abandonment argument may not have been that
compelling. Eriq Gardner, InfoWars Pays $15m to Settle “Pepe the Frog” Lawsuit,
The
Hollywood
Reporter,
June
10,
2019,
available
at
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/infowars-pays-15k-settle-pepe-frogcopyright-lawsuit-1217193.
6
Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359 (2010);
Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2001); Johnson, supra note
3; Lydia Pallas Loren, Building A Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of
Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning
the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1431 (2012).
4
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unsurprising. Until the pioneering work of Eduardo Peñalver and Lior
Strahilevitz, abandonment of physical property received little attention
from scholars either. Yet Peñalver and Strahilevitz showed that,
despite the dearth of attention paid to the topic, abandonment of
physical property is a rich topic worthy of careful scrutiny.7
Similarly, this Article seeks to illuminate the largely ignored
law and policy of copyright abandonment. We make the case that, just
as with physical property, copyright abandonment is a question of
practical and theoretical significance that deserves greater attention.
The very notion of abandoning copyright is fraught with conceptual
difficulty. The leading theory of abandonment—unilateral transfer—
is an admittedly poor fit for copyright since abandonment results in a
public good rather than a resource that can be claimed by a particular
owner.8 Moreover, the thing protected by copyright—the work of
authorship—is an abstraction, rather than a corporeal object. So while
one can conceive of easy ways to abandon a chattel—putting your old
TV on the curb with a sign reading “free”, for example—expressing
your intention to abandon rights in a work of authorship presents a
much thornier challenge. Further, it is easy to imagine reasons that
owners may want to abandon physical property: old furniture takes up
space, a boat requires upkeep, and there is perhaps peace to be found
in purging clutter.9 But copyrights take up no space and cost nothing
to maintain, so it seems counterintuitive that authors would ever give
up rights in a work. That said, the fact remains that owners do express
the desire to give up rights in their works with no pecuniary reward in
mind, however much this may frustrate the predictions of rationalchoice economics.
Copyright abandonment also presents a distinctive doctrinal
tangle. Blackletter law outlines the same basic test for relinquishing
rights in a work as it does for chattels: intent to abandon, plus some
overt act evidencing that intent. And while there were legal
mechanisms for abandoning a copyright under prior regimes, the 1976
Act jettisoned those formal requirements, leaving owners without any
clear pathway to place their work in the public domain.10 Courts have,
7

Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191
(2010); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355
(2010).
8
See infra Part I.B.
9
See generally MARIE KONDO, THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC OF TIDYING UP (2014);
MARGARETA MAGNUSSON, THE GENTLE ART OF SWEDISH DEATH CLEANING
(2018).
10
See infra Part III.A.
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however, continued to apply the common-law abandonment doctrine
under the post-76 Act regime, albeit with conflicting results that fail
to give authors clarity as to what acts are sufficient to inject their works
into the public domain.
As a result, the law frustrates otherwise aligned individual and
social preferences. Many copyright owners would like to abandon
their works, including some high-value ones. Abandonment of such
works would advance copyright’s constitutional goals by enriching the
public domain. Yet copyright law itself remains a stumbling block
because of the muddled doctrinal and administrative structure of
abandonment.
This Article seeks to resolve this tension between the revealed
preferences of creators and the constitutional goals of copyright law,
on the one hand, and the interpretation and application of the law, on
the other. It explores the theoretical and doctrinal terrain of copyright
abandonment in order to outline reforms that could help abandonment
serve copyright law’s constitutional aims. It does so in four parts.
Part I briefly outlines the conceptual foundations of
abandonment in the contexts of both physical property and copyright.
In Part II, we turn to the welfare effects of abandonment, contrasting
the cost-benefit dynamic in physical property—characterized by high
private benefit but high social costs—to that of copyright—marked by
low private benefit and high social benefit. Despite this reversal in the
cost-benefit calculus, we demonstrate that rights holders nonetheless
seek to abandon their works for a variety of reasons. As Part III details,
however, even for copyright holders who prefer to abandon their
works, the legal framework for doing so remains unhelpfully opaque.
This analysis is based on our exhaustive examination of two
previously unappreciated datasets. First, we collected and reviewed
notices of abandonment filed with the Copyright Office over the last
forty years. Second, we evaluated nearly three hundred judicial
decisions, dating back to the early nineteenth century, that analyzed
copyright abandonment. Our analysis establishes a number of
descriptive claims about copyright abandonment, primarily that
neither statutory, administrative, nor judicial copyright law provide a
particularly clear path for those seeking to abandon their works, or for
those hoping to mine the public domain. Finally, we outline a number
of potential reforms to facilitate and optimize abandonment in Part IV.

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

I. CONCEPTUALIZING ABANDONMENT
Abandonment, as a legal concept, remains poorly understood.
Although Strahilevitz and Peñalver made important inroads with
respect to chattel abandonment, no similar work has investigated the
fundamental nature of copyright abandonment.11 We begin by first
exploring how the doctrine works in the context of physical property.
We then consider how the existing accounts of abandonment track
onto copyright. In so doing, we offer a theory of abandonment that
rejects the leading notion of abandonment as unilateral transfer in
favor of one that instead models abandonment as the owner’s
relinquishment of a legal relationship with their property.
A. Abandoning Property
The familiar constituent rights of property owners—use,
exclusion, and transfer—do not include the right to abandon. Yet there
is an intuitive sense that if an owner does not want to continue owning
something, it would be strange for law to prevent her from doing so.12
As J.E. Penner observed, “an unbreakable relation to a thing would
condemn the owner to having to deal with it. It would indeed be a
funny turn of events if … property in essence gave the things a person
owned a power over him.”13 Penner’s observation is rooted in a
conception of property committed to individual autonomy.14 If
ownership is an institution that both embodies and protects individual
liberty, then owners need the right to abandon, or else property may
burden owners more than it frees them.
The common-law tradition creates a limited right to abandon
personal property pursuant to a two-part test. An owner who wishes to
abandon her chattel may do so if she forms the subjective intent to
relinquish it and also engages in some overt act reflecting that
intention.15 If you want to get rid of your old couch, for example,
11

See Johnson, supra note 3.
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 485
(2d ed. 2012) (“Owner sovereignty is . . . commonly thought to include the right to
abandon property (throw it away or relinquish all claim to title)[.]”).
13
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 79 (1997).
14
Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 381-82 (discussing Penner’s notion of abandonment
as rooted in a vision of property as a site of individual autonomy).
15
Ritz v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1991); JOHN G.
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 4.03[B][2], p.38 (4th ed. 2017)
12

7
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merely wishing it gone from your living room is not enough. You
would need to also engage in some act that a reasonable person would
understand as indicating a desire to abandon. This may mean placing
the couch on the curb on bulk item trash day or in your front yard with
a sign reading “Free.”16 At that point, abandonment is complete; the
thing ceases to belong to the owner. Some forms of property, like your
unwanted couch, are treated as res derelictae—cast-off resources, free
for others to claim as their own exclusive property.17 Others, like
copyrighted works, become res communes—shared public resources,
free for all to use.18
Recent work on abandonment characterizes it as a unilateral
transfer.19 This definition at first blush seems oxymoronic. The nature
of transfer is bilateral: sales involve a seller and a buyer; gifts involve
a donor and a donee.20 While we critique this account below,
unilaterality is essential to abandonment. It is different from other
forms of alienation precisely because it is a one-sided cession of
property rights. The abandoning owner gives up their legal
relationship to the thing, but the identity of the subsequent owner—if
in fact there ever is one—is not known and is unrelated to the
abandoning owner’s relinquishment of their rights.
This abstract account of abandonment, though, becomes more
complicated in practice. Permitting unfettered abandonment would
(“Property is abandoned when the owner (a) intends to relinquish all right, title, and
interest in it, but not transfer title to any particular person; and (b) takes action that
manifests this intent.”).
16
This turns in part on the prevailing norms within the community. In most cities,
items unattended on the sidewalk communicate that they are free for taking. A couch
placed outside in a college town, however, may not communicate the same message.
See Paul Parker, The Couches of Kirkersville, http://parker.sites.truman.edu/thecouches-of-kirksville.
17
Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman
Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 15 (2010).
See, e.g., Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506-07 (1871). The act of
abandonment thus creates a race to determine subsequent ownership via first
possession. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
18
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in the Information Age, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 89 (2003); Geer v.
State of Conn., 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) (referring to res communes as “those things
which were common to all belonged no more to one than to the others”).
19
Strahilevitz, supra note 7; Peñalver, supra note 7 at 198 (“what distinguishes
abandonment as a legal concept … is that it is a purely unilateral act”).
20
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “transfer” as “a conveyance
of property or title from one person to another”).
8
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impose widespread social costs since unwanted property is likely to
have low or even negative value.21 Placing your garbage on the curb
for pickup complies with local ordinances and does not create an
eyesore or a smelly mess for the neighborhood. But placing your old
couch in a public park may be less an act of generosity than an attempt
to rid yourself of and unwanted and bulky item taking up too much
space in your home.
Law thus places a number of constraints on owners who want
to abandon their things. Most importantly, abandonment is available
at common law only for chattels, not for real property.22 Abandoning
land can create particularly significant social costs. When underwater
owners walked away from homes en masse during the Great
Recession, the result was vandalism, squatting, and decay, all of which
drove down property values and accelerated economic decline.23 And
without an owner of record, the state cannot levy and collect taxes on
real property.24
While blackletter law allows owners to abandon chattel
property, this prerogative is subject to a number of legal and practical
limits. Local laws designed to prevent owners from externalizing
disposal costs often override the common-law freedom to abandon.
Trash may be disposed of only on certain days in certain places. In
most cities, you would be subject to a municipal citation for dumping
your old fax machine on a park bench. And because Floridians tend to

21

See Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 372-75 (enumerating the social costs of
abandonment). Even Penner acknowledges that the individual’s autonomy interest
in abandonment must be balanced against non-owners’ autonomy interest in not
having the costs of owners’ abandonment thrust upon them without consent.
PENNER, supra note 13, at 79-80 (“[W]hile the interest underpinning property
incorporates the interest in getting rid of things on one longer wants, people also
have an interest in not being harmed by the way that people deal with their things.”).
22
Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995); SPRANKLING, supra note 15 § 4.03[B][1], p.38 n.9 (“[T]he abandonment
doctrine only applies to personal property; real property cannot be abandoned.”).
23
Richard Florida, Vacancy: America’s Other Housing Crisis, CITYLAB (July 27,
2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/07/vacancy-americas-other-housingcrisis/565901; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, IMPACT OF THE
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CRISIS ON VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES IN
CITIES (2010).
24
Cf. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12 at 489 (tracing the prohibition on
abandonment of real property to “the incidents and services that landowners were
supposed to perform in feudal England, which meant that there could be no gap in
the ‘seisin’ of real property”).

9
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let their boats float away, either because they grow bored of the salt
life or because the watercraft has proven too expensive to maintain,
their state passed a law that required watercraft owners to sell their
boats or bear their ownership costs.25 In light of this, Peñalver argues
that abandonment is much more difficult than the common-law rule
lets on.26 Given the likelihood of municipal fines and the risk of
trespass, he regards the right to abandon personalty as “illusory.”27
The blackletter law of abandonment is thus clear in theory but
muddled in practice. Owners have a theoretical right to abandon, but
a series of limits cabin their ability to do so. These limits derive from
reasonable concerns about the social costs of abandoning property.
But how do the law and policy of abandonment change when we move
from physical property to copyrights?
B. Abandoning Copyrights
Courts have long articulated the same common-law standard
for abandonment of copyrights that applies to corporeal things.28 If an
owner wants to unilaterally dispossess herself of a copyright, she must
form an intention to do so and engage in some overt act reflecting that
intent.29 The consequences of abandonment, though, are quite
different in the copyright context. Abandoned physical things are up
for grabs until they are claimed by another owner. By contrast,
abandoned copyrighted works instantly become part of the public
25

State law empowers the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to
collect derelict boats and order their owners to reclaim them within five days.
Owners who fail to do so are subject to criminal fines and removal costs. FLA. STAT.
tit. XL VI, § 823.11(4) (2019). See Peñalver, supra note 7 at 204-05 (“The [Floridian
boat] owner cannot disclaim responsibility by saying she has abandoned the boat
and that it is, as a result, no longer her concern.”).
26
Id. at 202-08.
27
Id. at 194 (“Viewing the law concerning the right to abandon as a unitary legal
structure … reveals that the owner’s right to abandon (even chattels) is largely
illusory.”).
28
For a full discussion of the history and contemporary status of copyright
abandonment case law, see Part III infra.
29
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.06 (2019) (“Abandonment occurs only if there is
an intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights in her work. There is,
moreover, strong authority holding that an overt act evidencing such intent is
necessary to establish abandonment.”); see National Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.) (holding that an owner
may abandon a copyright, but “must abandon it by some overt act which manifests
his purpose to surrender his rights in the work and to allow the public to copy it”).
10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

domain, available for use by anyone, not just by the first user to stake
a claim.30
Strahilevitz concludes that, since copyright interests cannot be
subsequently reacquired by private owners, copyright abandonment is
not abandonment at all. “Copyright ‘abandonment’ is therefore in
some sense an inapt phrase,” he writes. “There is no ‘roll’ of the dice
following the abandonment of a copyright—ownership of an
abandoned copyrighted work is necessarily public.”31
We recognize that copyright and physical property
abandonment are distinct in this respect, but are not convinced that
this means that there is no true abandonment of copyrights. For one
thing, copyright and physical property abandonment are more alike
than different. They are both voluntary relinquishments of ownership
rights. They both cause the abandoned thing to be available for anyone
to use. Strahilevitz stresses that abandoned copyrights are not “up for
30

Nat’l Comics, 191 F.2d at 598. U.S. trademark law explicitly allows for
abandonment. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (noting that a mark is abandoned if it
becomes generic or “its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume,” which
may be inferred after three consecutive years of nonuse). In contrast to copyrights,
abandoned trademarks become available for others to adopt and establish
exclusivity. See Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d
628, 629–630 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Upon the mark's abandonment, a free-for-all
ensued…. [and the parties] ‘were equally free to attempt to capture the mark to their
own use.’”); George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400 (4th
Cir. 2009) (“Once abandoned, a mark returns to the public domain…”). But see
Jorge Contreras, Sui-Genericide (arguing that if a trademark owner abandons its
mark by causing it to become a generic term, that market effectively enters the public
domain.) Camilla Hrdy and Mark Lemley argue that abandoned trade secrets, like
most trademarks, can be claimed by new owners. See Camilla Hrdy & Mark Lemley,
Abandoning Trade Secrets. In light of the novelty requirement, abandoned patents—
like copyrights—remain in the public domain. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2018) (noting
that a “patent shall expire” if maintenance fees are not paid within a six month grace
period).
31
Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 391-92. Peñalver does not consider copyright
abandonment, but his understanding of it would apply equally to copyrights and
physical chattel property. He defines the essence of abandonment as the “intent to
sever one’s ties of ownership, not an intent to convey the property to a particular
person.” Peñalver, supra note 7 at 197. Courts have also tended to define
abandonment without insisting on a requirement that the abandoned good be made
susceptible of future private ownership. See, e.g., Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d
211, 221 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (defining abandoned property as “that to which the
owner has voluntarily relinquished all right, title, claim and possession, with the
intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting ownership in any other
person, and with the intention of not reclaiming any future rights therein”).

11
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grabs” in the sense that abandoned physical property is because they
cannot be claimed as private property by the next possessor.32 Yet
abandoned copyrights are in a sense more “up for grabs” than
abandoned corporeal things because their public domain status makes
them permanently available for anyone to use.33
Moreover, the identity of the eventual owner of abandoned
property is less important than the intent and conduct of the
abandoning owner. Even accepting arguendo the characterization of
abandonment as a unilateral transfer, it is effective upon the owner’s
completion of whatever acts are necessary to perfect cession of their
rights, regardless of the eventual disposition of the property.34 In the
case of both physical chattels and copyrights, the owner forms an
intention to give up their rights and then manifests that intent. The
post-hoc effect of that decision does not change the owner’s intention
or its manifestation, so is irrelevant to whether the law recognizes an
abandonment.35
In light of this, abandonment is not best understood as a
transfer at all. The major flaw of the unilateral transfer theory is that it
fails to capture the all-too-common situation in which the original
owner severs any legal right to the property, but no one claims the
abandoned object. As Penalver concedes, even in the absence of a
claimant of the res derelictae, abandonment has occurred. Not
surprisingly then, characterizing abandonment as unilateral transfer
clashes with our intuitions—and law’s definitions—of transfer as an

32

Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 392.
In other jurisdictions, abandonment results in cession to the public. Civil law
regimes, such as Poland, France, and Argentina, permit owners to relinquish their
rights in real property, at which point it becomes public land, owned and
administered by the state. Polish Civil Code., art. 179, § 1; Code Civil [Fr.], art. 713;
Código Civil [Arg.], art. 2376, ¶ 1. Brazil holds abandoned land as vacant property
whose title passes to the state after ten years. Código Civil [Br.], arts. 589 § 2, 592.
Strahilevitz does acknowledge these regimes, and stresses that they amount to
“abandonment in the colloquial sense,” though they “do not satisfy [his] narrow
definition of abandonment.” Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 394.
34
Cf. Peñalver at 198 (observing that abandonment “does not depend on the consent
of any third party for its completion”).
35
To illustrate the point, if you formed an intent to abandon your fax machine and
left it on a park bench with a sign saying, “Free,” and then no one took it, it would
remain on the bench as res derelictae. But the fact that no one chose to take
possession of fax machine would not mean that I had not abandoned it.
33
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act defined by bilaterality. As Blackstone understood, transfer is “[t]he
passing of a thing or of property from one person to another.”36
For copyright in particular, understanding abandonment as a
transfer seems particularly implausible. For one thing, valid transfers
under the Copyright Act must be reflected in a signed, written
agreement.37 But when courts evaluate claims of abandonment, they
make no effort to ensure compliance with that statutory requirement,38
suggesting that they do not regard abandonment as subject to
copyright law’s transfer rules.39
For these reasons, we argue that transfer is not best conceptual
model for abandonment. Rather, abandonment should be understood
as the relinquishment of a property right.40 In contrast to a transfer,
abandonment entails relinquishment of property rights by the owner
without those rights vesting in another person. This avoids the
conceptual contradiction of characterizing unclaimed property as
having been transferred to a party who may never materialize. And
unlike the transfer theory, this model captures both abandonment that
results in res derelictae as well as res communes, giving this account
more explanatory leverage. In either case, the owner, through acts that
manifest their intent, has voluntarily relinquished their rights in the
thing they once owned. Moreover, our theory comports better with
intuitions about the essence of abandonment, since it focuses on the
owner’s choice to sever a legal relationship. Indeed, this is how
Black’s Law Dictionary defines abandonment: “relinquishing of a
right or interest with the intention of never reclaiming it.”41
One important consequence for copyright law flows from the
recognition of abandonment as a relinquishment or elimination of
legal rights rather than a transfer of them. The Copyright Act permits
authors and their heirs to terminate copyright transfers and licenses

36

2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 291.
Id. 204(a).
38
See infra Part III.C.
39
Copyright’s statutory definition of “transfer” makes no reference to abandonment.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “transfer”).
40
Here, we understand “relinquishment” to mean the unilateral relinquishment of
ownership. In a different sense, voluntary transfers such as sales or gifts result in the
relinquishment of the transferor’s rights, but those are obviously not instances of
abandonment.
41
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37
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executed decades prior.42 These provisions are designed to give
authors an opportunity to renegotiate unfavorable contract terms or
regain control over commercially valuable works. To the extent
abandonment is understood as a transfer to the public, the termination
provisions might suggest that choice could be undone by an author’s
estate decades later, significantly disrupting expectations about the
durability of the public domain. But once we understand abandonment
as the relinquishment of rights, there is no transfer to terminate and no
opportunity to claw works back from the public domain.43
With this conceptual understanding of abandonment and the
unique considerations that arise in the copyright context, we turn
below to a different set of concerns—namely, the private and social
costs of copyright abandonment and the ways in which they shape an
owner’s decision to relinquish rights.
II. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF ABANDONMENT
Beyond its theoretical interest, abandonment has important
practical consequences. As a widespread but little appreciated
phenomenon, voluntary relinquishment of property rights generates
costs and benefits both for owners and for society. This Part explores
the social cost calculus of copyright abandonment, contrasting the
practice’s upsides and downsides with those of abandoning physical
property. This account in turn informs the puzzle of copyright
abandonment: why would anyone choose to abandon a work of
authorship?
A. The Social Costs of Abandoning Physical Property
It is easy to imagine why owners of physical things may
choose to abandon them. Physical property can decay, take up space,
require upkeep, and be taxed. As the prevalence of hoarding and the
42

See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2018) (“[T]he exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a
transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the
author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to
termination.”); id. § 304(c).
43
One might worry that authors could be coerced in to abandoning their works in
much the same way some were pressured to sign unfavorable licenses and
assignments. We think this is unlikely since publishers, the parties most likely to
exert such pressure, have little to gain by placing works they hope to exploit
commercially in the public domain.
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success of self-storage facilities illustrate, there are real human costs
to having excess stuff. In response, we have witnessed the exploding
popularity of Marie Kondo’s work promising spiritual peace in giving
things away.44
In some cases, an owner’s unwanted good is more valuable to
someone else. In an efficient market, that would lead to a voluntary
sale. If you don’t want your old couch, and someone else is willing to
pay $25 for it, that sale will make both of you better off. But you may
reasonably conclude that the costs of finding a buyer and engaging in
the sale are not worth the effort. If so, abandonment represents an
appealing option. You free yourself of an piece of furniture and make
it available to someone who may value it more highly, all without the
time and trouble of hunting for a willing seller for a low-value
transaction.45
Abandonment is clearly cost-justified to owners where it
represents a simple way to rid themselves of low- or negative-value
goods. But abandonment can inflict corresponding social costs. The
fax machine might go unclaimed, cluttering the park. Ultimately it
may need to be disposed of as garbage at the public’s expense. If so,
abandonment is little more than a means of taking low- or negativevalue property and making it society’s problem. In response, state and
local governments have passed laws that regulate or even ban
abandonment.
As Strahilevitz highlights, though, a significant number of
abandoned goods are of high value and result in value-creating
transfers.46 People may abandon goods with significant market value
if they are associated with a tragedy for the owner, like death or
divorce.47 Balls hit into the stands at Major League Baseball games
are free for whoever manages to lay claim to them, and can be worth
many thousands of dollars.48 Other modern practices, such as creating
digitally-powered treasure hunts via geocaching, provide still more
44

See generally KONDO, supra note 9 (outlining a methodology for de-cluttering
one’s life as a means to greater well-being).
45
Giving the fax machine away presents similar transaction costs. Cf. Strahilevitz,
supra note 7 at 370-71 (“Abandonment is advantageous because it enables an owner
to rid herself of property while incurring neither the transaction costs of a bilateral
transfer nor the decision costs associated with a gift.”).
46
Strahilevitz, supra note 7 at 365-71 (enumerating the examples that follow in this
paragraph of abandoned positive-market-value goods).
47
Id.
48
Id.
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illustrations of the surprising prevalence of abandoning positive-value
property.49
The motivations for these practices vary. An owner may want
to abandon goods with powerfully negative personal meaning as the
quickest, cheapest means of separating himself from them. MLB
likely abandons baseballs hit into the stands because it attracts more
fans to games. And people who leave items in geocaches are likely
doing so due to a combination of intrinsic enjoyment and reciprocity
norms. Even when disclaimed property is socially valuable, though,
abandoning it threatens to create costs in the form of confusion about
the property’s state of title and lawless races to claim it.50
The actual practice of abandonment is thus more complicated
than a rational-choice analysis would predict. While one would expect
abandonment only of low-value goods, owners often abandon even
high-value chattels for a variety of self- and other-regarding reasons.
This quick summary of the costs, benefits, and reality of physical
property abandonment sets the stage for the ensuing discussion of the
very different social welfare calculus of abandoning copyrights.
B. The Social Benefits of Abandoning Copyrights
If the abandonment of physical property benefits owners but
results in externalized social costs, the social welfare calculus of
copyright abandonment is nearly a mirror image. As we show,
abandoning a copyright tends to be costly to owners while generating
positive spillovers for society.
1. Private Welfare Effects
The work of authorship is an abstraction. Copyright law vests
rights in creative expression itself—the work of authorship—separate
and apart from the physical medium—books, records, or hard drives—
in which that expression is embodied.51 Copyright ownership, as
currently structured, thus imposes none of the burdens that physical
49

Id.
Id. at 374-75 (discussing confusion and lawless-race costs); see also infra Part II
(discussing these ancillary costs in more detail and exploring how they apply to
copyright abandonment).
51
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied.”).
50
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chattel ownership does.52 Works of authorship do not decay; they do
not require storage space; and the state does not tax them. In turn,
abandoning them does not impose any of the costs associated with
physical property: no messy disposal, no risk of cluttering public and
private space, no revenue lost by the state. For these reasons,
abandonment of copyrights—even economically valueless ones—
cannot be explained in terms of relieving owners of the kinds of costs
that physical property ownership may impose.53
Copyright abandonment thus seems to bring owners few
monetary benefits. It does, however, threaten owners with some
obvious costs. Abandoning a copyright means relinquishing forever
the ability to extract value from the work by leveraging exclusive
rights. In the case of highly valuable works, this could mean bidding
farewell to millions of dollars in royalties—which is why we are
unlikely to see, for example, J.K. Rowling abandon the rights to Harry
Potter. Aside from lost revenue, an owner who abandons their
copyright also cedes any ability to prevent uses of the work to which
they object.54 Matt Furie’s infringement lawsuit against Infowars’
unauthorized use of Pepe the Frog was inspired not by pecuniary
considerations, but by Furie being “dismayed by Pepe’s association

52

This is, of course, contingent on the design of the copyright system. Trademarks
and patents impose maintenance fees on owners, which abandonment eliminates for
owners. Copyright formalities like renewal and registration once imposed similar
burdens on copyright holders. We return to forms of architecture that promise to
raise the costs of copyright abandonment to an optimal level in Part IV, infra.
53
Ownership of a work can impose certain cognitive and emotional costs, however.
The pressure to review and respond to licensing requests or to police potentially
infringing uses require time and energy. Although the loss of control over a work
can impose its own burdens. Take, for example, Alan Moore. The author of
Watchmen and other massively popular comic books insists on receiving neither
credit nor compensation for adaptations of his work. See Adam Epstein, HBO’s
“Watchmen” Is Great. It’s Comic Creator Alan Moore Wants Nothing to Do With
It, QUARTZ, Oct. 21, 2019, https://qz.com/quartzy/1732050/why-alan-moore-wantsnothing-to-do-with-hbos-watchmen.
54
Owners have used their copyrights in this defensive fashion since the inception of
the doctrine. See Shyam Balganesh, Censorial Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2020) (tracing the history of censorial uses of copyright to the early
1700s). Scholars disagree about whether this practice is socially valuable. Compare
Balganesh, Censorial Copyright (advancing a limited defense of censorial
copyright) with John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015)
(broadly criticizing censorial copyright).
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with white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and the alt-right.”55 Similarly,
Carol Highsmith, after donating tens of thousands of photographs to
the Library of Congress, sued Getty Images after the company charged
for licenses to use the images and failed to properly credit her.56
Of course, most copyrighted works earn little or no revenue.
Those that are valuable tend to have short economic lifespans,
accruing all of their revenue within a decade or so.57 Even so, owners
may decline to give up their rights on the off-chance that they may
start earning again later in life. Nicholas Taleb coined the phrase
“black swan” for a low-probability, high-impact negative event, like
the housing market crash of 2008.58 But there are also “golden
swans”—low-probability, high-impact positive events such as
winning the lottery. Copyright holders may hang on to an unprofitable
work because they hope for such an unlikely event. While rare, golden
swans are not unheard of. James Kennedy Toole found no publishers
for his comic novel A Confederacy of Dunces for decades, eventually
taking his life in part over the manuscript’s apparent failure. Only
following his death did his mother finally get the book published,
when it became a modern classic and commercial success.59
Various cognitive biases exacerbate copyright owners’
tendencies to retain ownership of works that appear largely worthless.
Optimism bias causes us to overestimate the chances of good
outcomes.60 This is why lottery tickets sell so well. Related, the

55

Bret Barrouquere, Creator of Pepe the Frog Gets Trial Date in Case Against Alex
Jones,
SPLCENTER.ORG
(Sept.
13,
2018),
available
at
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/13/creator-pepe-frog-gets-trial-datecase-against-alex-jones.
56
First Amended Complaint, Highsmith v. Getty Images, No. 16-cv-05924
(S.D.N.Y.).
57
Kristelia Garcia & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 71
ALA. L. REV. 351, 383 (2019) (“[M]ost information goods earn the majority of all
the revenue that they are ever going to earn in the first five to ten years following
their release[.]”).
58
NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
xxii (2d ed. 2010) (defining a black swan event as possessing “rarity, extreme
impact, and retrospective predictability”).
59
Karl Miller, An American Tragedy, NEW STATESMAN AMERICA, Mar. 5, 1999,
available at https://www.newstatesman.com/node/148778 (recounting the life and
death of O’Toole and the posthumous success of A Confederacy of Dunces)
60
Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
204 (2006) (“Optimism bias refers to the tendency of people to believe that their
own probability of facing a bad outcome is actually lower than it is.”).
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endowment effect causes us to overvalue things we own relative to fair
market value.61 Thus copyright owners of economically inert works
may rate their appeal far higher than the zero value the work would
actually fetch in open exchange.62 Such owners would be unwilling to
abandon their works, believing against all evidence that a seller will
eventually pay them some inflated price.
The private welfare calculus of copyright abandonment is the
polar opposite of abandonment of physical chattels. Abandonment of
physical assets flourishes, and must be restrained by law, because it
tends to benefit owners by allowing them to offload the costs of lowor negative-value property. By contrast, abandoning a copyright seems
to be all downside for an owner. Abandonment sacrifices the ability to
profit from or control a work, while gaining nothing since a copyright
imposes no maintenance costs.63 That asymmetry holds for the public
welfare effects of copyright and physical property abandonment as
well.
2. Public Welfare Effects
Compared to physical property, copyright abandonment offers
greater promise for creating social value. For one thing, abandoned
works do not become privately owned by the next taker, but enter the
public domain.64 Expressive works are, by nature, public goods; they
are both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. By limiting their
61

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
211, 213 (Cass Sunstein, ed.) (describing and illustrating the endowment effect, and
describing it as a manifestation of loss aversion).
62
See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual
Property: An Experiment, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 26 (2010).
63
As discussed below, there are non-pecuniary interests that may—and do—
motivate some owners to abandon their works. See infra Part II.C. But from the
strictly pecuniary perspective that typifies copyright policy, owners rarely have
incentives to abandon. Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral
Psychology of Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2438-44 (2016)
(describing copyright’s focus on pecuniary interests to the exclusion of nonpecuniary ones).
64
The “public domain” is a term with a number of overlapping and sometimes
competing definitions. Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains,
55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006). Our definition most closely resembles Samuelson’s Public
Domain 1, with the exception that we limit our discussion to copyright, to the
exclusion of other regimes that may impose limitations on the use of such works.
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reproduction and use, copyright law seeks to convert them to private
goods. Abandonment, by contrast, strips away that artificial scarcity.
As a result, abandoning a work generates utility for the thousands or
even millions of people who can now freely access and use it.65
Related, abandonment promotes the distinctive normative
aims of copyright law: increasing public access to information goods.
For utilitarians, at least, the goal of any body of law is to maximize
social welfare.66 In the context of real and chattel property, law tends
to achieve this end by facilitating the highest-value uses of land and
goods by private owners.67 Copyright, by contrast, seeks to maximize
social value not only by enriching the owners of works. Rather, the
ultimate aim of copyright law is to enrich the public by incentivizing
the production of creative and informative works of authorship.68 By
encouraging the creation of works by means of a shorter-term
monopoly,69 the longer-term goal is to provide the public with access

65

Abandonment can also reduce information costs associated with copyright
ownership. Given the divisibility and transferability of copyright interests,
identifying the owner of a work is often difficult. Transfers of copyright ownership
are generally not recorded, complicating efforts to track rights holders over time.
These difficulties contribute to the orphan works problem—the inability to identify
or locate copyright holders, hampering efforts to license those works. Since
abandonment is irrevocable, it cuts off the possibility of future assignments and
exclusive licenses. And since it requires some clear evidence of the intent to
abandon, users are more likely to have notice of the work’s public domain status.
Additionally, abandonment can clarify the status of works of questionable copyright
eligibility.
66
See RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 4-5 (2005)
(summarizing Bentham’s views on utilitarianism as a preference for choices that
tend to maximize the welfare (“greatest happiness”) of all affected persons).
67
Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967) (arguing that property rights emerge in order to allow owners to
internalize as much value as possible from the exploitation of their res).
68
Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose can be achieved.”).
69
Of course, copyright terms are no longer “shorter-term” by any reasonable
definition. On the contrary, consensus has emerged that their current length—life of
the author plus seventy years, see 17 U.S.C. § 303, is far too long. E.g., Linda Cohen
& Roger Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT.
L. REV. 453, 471 (2001) (“[N]o plausible incentive rationale exists for this incredibly
long duration.”).
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to a richer array of information goods.70 This aspiration is rooted in
the Constitution, which confers on Congress the power to create
“exclusive rights” only for “limited times” and for the purpose of
“promoting the progress of science.”71 In this scheme, owners’ rights
are only a means to an end, extended as an incentive only as minimally
necessary to encourage the creation of such works.72
But the case for the public domain is not merely a matter of
commitment to abstract principles. The public domain has practical,
measurable effects on consumer welfare and creativity.73 First, as Paul
Heald has demonstrated, public domain works are often more widely
available than their copyrighted counterparts.74 Moreover, public
domain works—since they can be offered by a variety of competing
publishers without compensation to rights holders—are generally less
expensive.75 Beyond promoting access, the public domain facilitates
new creative production “by leaving the raw material of authorship
available for authors to use.”76 Derivative works based on public
domain materials are a substantial component of the copyright market.
In the film industry for example, recent years have seen multiple

70

This is the “incentive/access paradigm” that numerous scholars have invoked as
the central framework for understanding copyright. E.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2009) (calling the “incentives/access tradeoff … the
familiar foundation for normative discussions about the desirable scope of
intellectual property”). Scholars have called striking the proper balance between
incentives and access “the central problem in copyright law.” William Landes &
Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
326 (1989).
71
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. At the time of the Framing, “science” was understood
to extend to creative and informative works. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress
Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV.
(2001); but see Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013
BYU L. REV. 259 (arguing that the original meaning of “science” was more narrow
and excluded speech unprotected by the First Amendment).
72
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.”).
73
See generally GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS (2019).
74
Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 829 (2014); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted
Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031 (2008).
75
Id.
76
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
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adaptations of Alice in Wonderland, Peter Pan, The Jungle Book,
Sherlock Holmes, King Arthur, and Robin Hood, among others.77
Some critics have argued that abandonment could result in
wasteful overuse of public domain works. Posner and Landes argue
that the owners of works act as stewards, controlling and limiting their
use to make sure that the work is not cheapened by low-quality
exploitation.78 But recent scholarship suggests just the opposite.
Studies have shown that the effect of private ownership on creative
production is at best indeterminate, and possibly even negative.79 The
bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that innovation and creativity
thrive when works are free, not when they are subject to exclusive
rights.80 Other research shows in particular that entering the public
domain does not cause works to disappear. To the contrary, Chris
Buccafusco and Paul Heald have shown that public domain works are
commercialized at a higher rate than copyrighted ones, and at a similar
level of quality.81 Moreover, we should expect reduced market
demand to discipline producers of derivatives based on over-exploited
public domain works. If studios produce too many Robin Hood films,
for example, declining revenue would make future Robin Hood
sequels and reboots less likely. On the whole, abandonment should

77

See List of Modernized Adaptations of Old Works, WIKIPEDIA
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_modernized_adaptations_of_old_works.
78
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 213 (“[A]ll valuable resources, including
copyrightable works, should be owned, in order to create incentives for their
efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse.”). Landes & Posner’s argument was
rooted in Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, which has since been discredited as
descriptively inaccurate and rooted in the author’s eugenicist beliefs. See Matto
Mildenberger, The Tragedy of The Tragedy of the Commons, SCI. AM., Apr. 23,
2019, available at https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/the-tragedy-of-thetragedy-of-the-commons/.
79
See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 623 (2012) (citing and summarizing this literature).
80
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace
Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 528-32 (2009) (“The desire to create can
be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic incentive.
Psychological and social concepts can do more to explain the creative impulses than
classical economics. [A] copyright law that treats creativity as a product of
incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”).
81
Christopher Buccafusco & Paul Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Fall
Into the Public Domain? Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28
BERKELEY J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013).
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translate to greater commercialization and accessibility, thereby
advancing copyright’s core aspirations.
The public welfare benefits of abandonment are particularly
salient given the long history of owner-friendly legal reforms that
expanded the temporal and substantive breadth of copyrights,
radically reducing the scope of the public domain. Historically, works
have entered the public domain in five ways. First, works ineligible
for copyright protection—those that exhibit insufficient originality or
useful articles with inseparable pictorial or graphical elements, for
example—are part of the public domain ab initio. Second, works enter
the public domain at the expiration of their copyright term.82 Third,
under the pre-1978 dual-term regimes, works entered the public
domain when copyright holders neglected to renew. Fourth, the failure
to comply with formal requirements of copyright—notice and, less
commonly, deposit—resulted in forfeiture of copyright. Finally,
intentional abandonment of copyright can dedicate works to the public
domain.
Aside from abandonment, each of these mechanisms for
building the public domain has faced considerable legislative and
judicial limitations. The congressional expansion of copyright to new
categories of works—sound recordings,83 software,84 architecture,85 to
name a few recent examples—and the arguable embrace of previously
ineligible useful articles by the Supreme Court in Star Athletica86 have
reduced the public domain. A series of copyright term extensions,
beginning in 183187 and culminating in the Copyright Term Extension
Act in 1998,88 have slowed the flow of works into the public domain
to a trickle. Until 2019, no works had joined the U.S. public domain
through this mechanism for two decades. And no works created under
the current statute will enter the public domain until the end of 2048,

82

17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018).
Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 85 Stat. 391.
84
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (1980).
85
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990).
86
Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. ___ (2017).
87
Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436.
88
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105—298, §102(b) and (d), 112 Stat.
2827—2828
83
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at the earliest.89 Moreover, renewal failures were reasonably common
until the 1976 Act adopted the current unitary term of protection.90 But
that shift removed the opt-in character of the second half of copyright
terms, thereby eliminating a simple mechanism for sorting works of
low perceived value into the public domain.91 And perhaps most
importantly, neither the notice nor the deposit requirements carry the
risk of forfeiture today.92 As a result of the shift from a system in
which copyright required authors to opt-in to one in which copyrights
vest automatically upon fixation,93 trillions of works that would have
otherwise been part of the public domain are instead subject to
copyright.94 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 even
created, for the first time, a mechanism by which parties could restore
the copyrights in works that had reached the public domain.95And
even when works are unquestionably in the public domain, litigants
and would-be rightsholders have found ways to impose limitations on

89

Assuming an author created a work on Jan. 1, 1978 and died that same day,
copyright would persist for an additional 70 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018).
90
Zvi S. Rosen & Richard Schwinn, An Empirical Study of 225 Years of Copyright
Registrations, TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2643075
(calculating a renewal rate for all U.S. copyrighted works ranging from roughly 10%
to 20% throughout the twentieth century)Sean Redmond, U.S. Copyright History
1923-1964,
NEW
YORK
PUBLIC
LIBRARY,
May
31,
2019,
https://www.nypl.org/blog/2019/05/31/us-copyright-history-1923-1964; (reporting
a renewal rate of toughly 25% for books from 1923-1964).
91
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 498
(2004) (pointing out that with bifurcated terms, owners of lower-value works would
decline to file for renewal, causing those works to enter the public domain after 28
years).
92
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.100-568, 102 Sta.
2853 (1988).
93
Id.
94
In 2018 alone, an estimated 1.2 trillion photos were taken worldwide. Caroline
Cakebread, People will take 1.2 trillion digital photos this year—thanks to
smartphones,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.businessinsider.com/12-trillion-photos-to-be-taken-in-2017-thanks-tosmartphones-chart-2017-8. And nearly 300 billion emails are sent every day. Heinz
Tschabitscher , The Number of Emails Sent Per Day in 2019 (and 20+ Other Email
Facts), LIFEWIRE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-emails-aresent-every-day-1171210.
95
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2018) (allowing restoration of copyright for works by foreign
authors that had fallen into the public domain for failure to comply with pre-1976
Act statutory formalities); see Golan v. Gonzales, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (affirming
constitutionality of URAA’s copyright restoration provisions).
24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

their use.96 Given these restraints, abandonment remains one of the
few means to funnel works into the public domain.
Today, copyright terms regularly extend for well over a
hundred years. But abandonment can render a work free for common
use well in advance of the statutory term. And because abandonment
reflects an owner’s choice to cede rights in their work, it allows owners
themselves to determine the proper length of their exclusive rights.97
In this sense, abandonment shares some traits with permissive
licenses like those provided by Creative Commons. Those licenses
give copyright holders the option to free their works from some of the
restrictions normally imposed by copyright law, facilitating uses by
the public without requiring cumbersome negotiations for each and
every use. Both abandonment and permissive licensing offer paths for
creators who prefer to forego some measure of their statutory
copyright entitlements.
But abandonment and Creative Commons licenses play related
but distinct roles in the copyright system. Abandonment works a
complete and total transfer to the public domain, while permissive
licensing helps copyright holders to permit some uses while
forbidding others. That basic operational distinction gives rise to two
important differences between abandonment and permissive licensing.
First, abandonment is irrevocable. It results in public domain
status and the destruction of any exclusive rights in the work. The
former owner has no legal mechanism for reclaiming a copyright once
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See Elizabeth Rosenblatt, The Adventure of the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 561 (2015); Warner Bros. V. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir.
2011).
97
If an owner feels that $20,000 suffices as fair reward for her work, and she extracts
that amount from a work within ten years, then she can abandon it then and allow
the public free access to it without sacrificing any incentive effects. By contrast, the
current copyright term—life of the author plus 70 years—is at best a crude
approximation of the lifespan of an author’s heirs, and is untethered to any notion of
optimal incentives. A group of prominent economists signed on to an amicus brief
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of
copyright term extension. They concluded that “it is highly unlikely that the
economic benefits from copyright [term] extension … outweigh the additional
costs.” Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., In re Eldred v. Ashcroft (May 20, 2002) at
3. Of course, many works were not created due to any incentive effects, such as
emails, cell phone photos, and even some art and literature. Authors unconcerned
about royalties or control should be willing to cede their works to the public domain
at zero cost—if they had a simple way to do so.
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abandoned.98 Creative Commons licenses are, by their own terms,
irrevocable.99 There are at least two considerations that cast doubt on
this insistence, however. For one thing, copyright licenses are
generally revocable in the absence of consideration.100 As bare grants
of permission, the Creative Commons licenses likely lack the sort of
consideration that would prompt a court to treat their irrevocability as
a binding contractual term. Even if CC licenses are not revocable at
will, they are likely subject to the Copyright Act’s termination of
transfer provisions, which extend to both exclusive and nonexclusive
licenses.101 Nor does the language describing the CC license as
“irrevocable” warrant a different conclusion, since statutory
termination of transfer operates regardless of license terms to the
contrary.102 Abandonment, for better or worse, is permanent in a way
no license can be.103
The second difference between abandonment and permissive
licenses relates to information costs.104 Creative Commons licenses,
98

See supra I.B.
See, e.g., Attribution 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode “Subject to the terms and
conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the
Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material.”).
100
Generally, nonexclusive licenses are revocable in the absence of consideration.
Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 n. 12 (4th Cir.1994) ( “an implied license
is necessarily nonexclusive and revocable absent consideration”); Keane Dealer
Servs., Inc. v. Harts, 968 F.Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“If no consideration
was given, the license was revocable, and the institution of this lawsuit would
constitute revocation.”); Johnson v. Jones, 885 F.Supp. 1008, 1013 n. 6
(E.D.Mich.1995); see also 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 10.02(B)(5).
A license that is irrevocable on its own terms will be treated as such only
when it is incorporated into an otherwise enforceable contract. See State St. Glob.
Advisors Tr. Co. v. Visbal, No. 1:19-CV-01719-GHW, 2020 WL 71162, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020) (“the Copyright License Agreement states that the license is
irrevocable. An irrevocable license is ‘[i]mpossible to retract or revoke.’) (quoting
Nano-Proprietary, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., 537 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2008)).
101
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2018) (“[T]he exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer
or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on
or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.”).
102
Id. at § 203(a)(5).
103
Lydia Loren has argued that Creative Commons licenses should be understood
as a partial abandonment of copyright as a means of increasing their reliability and
durability. See Loren, supra note 6 at_325-7.
104
Open licensing regimes entail a range of transaction costs. These include initial
review of works and their license terms, due diligence for mergers and acquisitions,
99
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for example, allow licensors some measure of choice in how their
works can be used. They permit licensors to allow or disallow
commercial uses and derivative works, for example.105 That flexibility
comes at the cost of ambiguity, however. How do users know whether
a use is commercial?106 How do they distinguish between derivatives
and mere reproductions?
IBM recently came under for fire for using nearly a million
CC-licensed images harvested from Flickr as training data for facial
recognition research.107 Many copyright holders were outraged by this
unexpected use of their images, prompting Creative Commons to issue
a statement108 and update its frequently asked questions to address the
intersection of CC-licensed works and AI.109 For licensors who
permitted commercial use, IBM’s facial recognition system revealed
potential unintended and unforeseen consequences. And for those who
limited their works to noncommercial use, it highlighted the ambiguity
of CC license terms as applied to early stage research. The simplicity
of abandonment would again prevent either outcome. Works
dedicated to the public domain are available for all to use, with no
exceptions or restrictions.
Software provides another case study in the challenges that
permissive licenses sometimes create. Early software developers

and management of internal use and external distribution of open-licensed materials.
See Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 768-775
(2013).
105
About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses
106
The question of the scope of the Creative Commons non-commercial license has
been litigated at least twice. See Great Minds v. Fedex Office & Print Servs., Inc.,
886 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that licensees can rely on third parties,
including commercial copy shops, to exercise their rights under the license); Great
Minds v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 18-55331, 2019 WL 7206433, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec.
27, 2019) (same).
107
Erik Carter, Facial recognition’s ‘dirty little secret’: Millions of online photos
scraped without consent, NBC NEWS, (MAR. 12, 2019, 3:32 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secretmillions-online-photos-scraped-n981921
108
Ryan Merkley, Use and Fair Use: Statement on shared images in facial
recognition
AI,
CREATIVE
COMMONS
(Mar.
13,
2019),
https://creativecommons.org/2019/03/13/statement-on-shared-images-in-facialrecognition-ai/
109
Artificial intelligence and CC licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses
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pioneered permissive licensing,110 but the licenses they rely on do not
always clearly reflect their intentions. Sometimes developers adopt
licenses they incorrectly believe dedicate their contributions to the
public domain; other times developers who likely dedicated their
works to the public domain distribute them with copyright.111 These
misunderstandings about the practical impact of permissive licenses
are widespread. Indeed, Clark Asay has argued that the chief reason
abandonment is not more common among software developers,
despite their apparent desire to dedicate works to the public, is the lack
of clarity surrounding license terms.112 A regime that provided owners
a clear pathway to abandonment would avoid this ambiguity.113
Some massively successful software projects have been
released under generous permissive licenses, suggesting that
abandonment may appeal to such developers as well.114 But even if
former blockbusters are unlikely to be abandoned, a functioning
abandonment doctrine can still enrich the public domain substantially.

110

See Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. Ill. J. L. Tech. & Pol’y 1,
8-9 (dating the origin of copyleft licenses to the late 1980s and the work of Richard
Stallman); Asay, supra note 104.
111
Id. at 791 n.213 (recounting these examples).
112
Id. at 790. Even users of such software of sometimes dissuaded by the risk
associated with unclear license terms. Id. at 785.
113
Even the Library of Congress makes uses ambiguous language when it makes
works it has acquired freely available to the public to “use and reuse.” Free to Use
and Reuse Sets, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/free-to-use. For
example, the Library “purchased the intellectual property rights” for the John
Margolies Roadside America Photograph Archive, which comprises some 11,000
photos taken over 40 years. Wendi Maloney, Free to Use and Reuse: John Margolies
Photographs of Roadside America, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, July 6, 2017,
https://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2017/07/free-to-use-and-reuse-john-margoliesphotographs-of-roadside-america. According to the Library, since it owns the rights
to the photos, “there are no known copyright restrictions on the photographs.” John
Margolies Roadside America Photograph Archive, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/res/723_marg.html. We think this statement is likely
insufficient evidence of intent to abandon, suggesting that the Library of Congress
itself lacks sufficient guidance for eliminating copyright restrictions on works it
promotes for free public use.
114
About 250 million people use Firefox, the web browser distributed under the
permissive Mozilla Public License. See Firefox Public Data Report,
https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/user-activity. And the Apache HTTP Server,
distributed under the eponymous license, serves more than 300 million websites.
January
2020
Web
Server
Survey,
NETCRAFT,
https://news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-server-survey.
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Thanks to the low standards of the 1976 Act,115 copyright inheres in
all manner of works that appear to have minimal freestanding
commercial value: your last email to a co-worker, that photo you
hastily took on your phone, even this article. Of course, few are
counting down the days until the smartphone photo you took of your
lunch last week is free from copyright, and some might question the
merit of adding a raft of similarly low-value works to the public
domain.
But works that have little value standing alone may have
considerable value in the aggregate. As technology develops, new uses
of works may emerge that leverage a more extensive public domain.
As Google’s efforts to index images and scan books demonstrates, a
searchable corpus of individual works has value greater than the sum
of its parts. Although both of those programs were ultimately endorsed
as fair uses, they were limited in ways that lessened their social utility.
Google Image Search offers access to thumbnail images, not full
resolution originals, and Google Books provides users snippets of
copyrighted books in the absence of a license. Public domain books,
in contrast, can be viewed in full and used without restriction.116 And
while successful assertions of fair use can secure some of the same
benefits of abandonment, such assertions are often expensive and
risky. Established firms like Google can expend the resources
necessary to test a novel fair use theory. But abandonment offers
greater clarity ex ante, favoring smaller actors.
Artificial intelligence training data presents another
compelling case for a public domain reinvigorated with works that
may appear to have little standalone value. For better or worse,
artificial intelligence promises to shift decision-making from humans
to automated systems they design. From banking,117 to driving,118 to
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All that is required for copyright to vest in a work of authorship is fixation of an
original work in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
116
The
Library
Project
–
Books
Help,
GOOGLE,
https://books.google.com/googlebooks/library/index.html.
117
Ted Greenwald, How AI Is Transforming the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ai-is-transforming-the-workplace1489371060.
118
Sigal Samuel, A new study finds a potential risk with self-driving cars: failure to
detect dark-skinned pedestrians, VOX, (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/3/5/18251924/self-driving-car-racial-bias-study-autonomous-vehicledark-skin.
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writing pop music,119 AI systems will play an increasingly important
role in our lives. Many AI systems “learn” to make decisions by
processing massive collections of human-created texts, images, and
recordings. As Amanda Levendowski has argued, copyright law has
contributed to the biases AI systems exhibit by steering developers
towards particular sorts of training data.120
AI developers, for example, have made repeated use of the
collection of 600,000 emails sent between Enron employees because
of their perceived public domain status and the low legal risk
associated with their use.121 Training AI how to write and think using
the emails of employees of a company engaged in massive fraud
presents obvious problems. But as Levendowski notes, existing public
domain works embed their own potential biases. The bulk of the public
domain comprises works published before 1924—works written
predominantly by wealthy white men, reflecting the prejudices and
assumptions of their era.122 A public domain populated by
contemporary works, even those with little independent commercial
value, would better reflect the values and composition of society.
In addition, such a reinvigorated public domain could
significantly reduce the transaction costs introduced by automatic
copyright protection. Creators of all sizes, from independent
documentarians and university presses to Hollywood studios and
massive trade publishers, expend considerable time and effort in
clearing often incidental uses of copyrighted material. This clearance
process is frustrated by fractured rights, orphan works, and other
practical hurdles.123 As a result, transaction costs can frustrate
otherwise mutually-desirable licenses.124 But since nearly every photo
or piece of music created in the last forty years is protected by
copyright, the cost of clearance is one creators and distributors must
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Bartu Kaleagasi, A New AI Can Write Music as Well as a Human Composer,
FUTURISM (Mar. 9, 2017), https://futurism.com/a-new-ai-can-write-music-as-wellas-a-human-composer.
120
Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018). There is, of course, no
guarantee that abandoned works would not introduce their own biases. But increased
availability of public domain training data would tend alleviate these concerns on
the whole.
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Id.
122
Id.
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See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
DIGITIZATION 105 (2015).
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Id.
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bear. Creative Commons licenses have significantly reduced those
costs by communicating a set of permissions for subsequent users that
do not require further negotiation. But those permissions are not
always sufficient and sometimes introduce ambiguity that militates in
favor of an explicit license. Abandonment, on the other hand,
simplifies the status of a work and eliminates the need for clearance
costs.
Abandonment of copyrighted works also avoids the social
costs typically associated with the abandonment of physical property.
Abandoned things create high disposal costs for society. But since
works of authorship have no physical existence, they do not threaten
to create clutter. Strahilevitz also shows that abandoned goods threaten
costly races to claim title. But since abandoned copyrights become
part of the public domain, free for all to use, there is no need to rush
to become their next owner. Finally, Strahilevitz raises the concern
that the presence of abandoned goods creates confusion about who
owns things, and whether they are owned at all. This concern is
relevant for copyright, which is already dogged by confusion about the
ownership of works. Abandonment could make ascertaining title even
more complex for some works. But a properly administered
abandonment doctrine would reduce those information costs by
clearly communicating the public domain status of works.125
It is also worth questioning the assumption that owners will
abandon only low- or zero-value works. Strahilevitz has shown that
abandonment of higher-value physical property is surprisingly
common. As we detail below, much the same is true for information
goods, where creators often aspire to place their works into the public
domain.
C. Revealed Preferences & Attempted Abandonment
The social cost calculus of abandoning copyrights is the polar
opposite of the social cost calculus of abandoning physical property.
Abandoning physical property tends to benefit owners while shifting
costs onto society, allowing owners to externalize the costs of low- or
negative-value property. By contrast, abandoning copyrights can be
costly for owners but beneficial for the public. It provides a means to
shorten overly long copyright terms and route works into the public
domain. This distinct cost-benefit mix raises a puzzle: If copyright

125

See infra Part IV.
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abandonment inflicts costs on owners, and primarily benefits the
public, why would an owner ever abandon their work?
Despite what rational-choice theory might predict, many
copyright owners—individuals and institutions alike—seek to place
high-value works in the public domain. Both artists and institutions
seek to give up control over their works. Photographer Carol
Highsmith, for example, has donated tens of thousands of photos to
the Library of Congress, expressly seeking to relinquish copyright.126
Jason Rohrer, the developer of popular video games like One Hour
One Life, disclaims any copyright and considers his works part of the
public domain.127 And software developers have for decades released
their programs under either explicit public domain dedications or
pursuant to licenses that approximate such dedication. And museums
such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art have sought to dedicate tens
of thousands of works to the public domain.
Demand for a simple mechanism to disclaim copyright was
sufficiently high that Creative Commons developed its CC0
designation. Unlike typical permissive licenses which rely on
copyright ownership, CC0 is meant to “place [designated works] as
completely as possible in the public domain,”128 reflecting the rights
holder’s “wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for
the purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and
scientific works.”129 But given the uncertainty surrounding the legal
status and application of abandonment, even Creative Commons
acknowledges the difficulty of dedicating a work to the public domain
before the expiration of the statutory copyright term.130 The key
operative provision of the CC0 instrument outlines a “waiver” of
copyright:
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Carey Dunn, Photographer Files $1 Billion Suit Against Getty for Licensing her
Public
Domain
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(July
27,
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https://hyperallergic.com/314079/photographer-files-1-billion-suit-against-gettyfor-licensing-her-public-domain-images/.
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See jasonrohrer, Comment to Open Letter to the Mobile Developers,
Onehouronelife.com
forums
(Mar.
1,
2019
5:48
AM),
http://onehouronelife.com/forums/viewtopic.php?id=5479.
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CC0, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/share-yourwork/public-domain/cc0.
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CC0
1.0
Universal,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode.
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The shift from earlier Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication to CC0
reflects, in part, these challenges. See Armstrong, supra note 6, at 423.
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To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in
contravention of, applicable law, Affirmer hereby
overtly,
fully,
permanently,
irrevocably
and
unconditionally waives, abandons, and surrenders all of
Affirmer's Copyright and Related Rights… fully
intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to
revocation, rescission, cancellation, termination, or any
other legal or equitable action.131
In addition, the CC0 terms contain a “fallback” license. In the
event the waiver is deemed legally invalid, the terms provide for “a
royalty-free, non-transferable, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive,
irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer's Copyright
and Related Rights in the Work.”132 In part, this belt-and-suspenders
tactic is demanded by the global reach of Creative Commons. CC0 is
meant to apply across jurisdictions with very different approaches
copyright abandonment. But as we will demonstrate in Part III, it
reflects the confused and unsettled law of abandonment in U.S.
copyright law in particular.
Despite the uncertainty as to its precise legal effect, CC0 has
been widely adopted. Nina Paley’s critically acclaimed film Sita Sings
the Blues is distributed under the CC0 instrument.133 The same is true
for nearly 4 million photos, including nearly 400,000 images from the
Metropolitan Museum of Art,134 100,000 from the Paris Musées,135
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1.0
Universal,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode.
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Nina Paley, Ahimsa: Sita Sings the Blues now CC-0 “Public Domain,” (Jan. 13,
2018), https://blog.ninapaley.com/2013/01/18/ahimsa-sita-sings-the-blues-now-cc0-public-domain/
134
Jennie Rose Halperin, New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art releases 375,000
digital works for remix and reuse online via CC0, CREATIVE COMMONS (Feb. 7,
2017), https://creativecommons.org/2017/02/07/met-announcement/.
135
Victoria Heath, Paris Musées Releases 100,000+ Works Into the Public Domain,
CREATIVE
COMMONS
(Jan.
10,
2020),
https://creativecommons.org/2020/01/10/paris-musees-releases-100000-worksinto-the-public-domain/.
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and 30,000 from the Cleveland Museum of Art.136 And websites like
Freesound offer hundreds of thousands of CC0 sound recordings.137
Prior to the emergence of the contemporary free software
movement, which relies on copyright to both grant permission and
often to impose restrictions on the use of licensed works, many early
software developers contributed their works to the public domain.138
Such works were often distributed without copyright notices, and
assumed to be free of any exclusive rights. But in the post-Berne era
of automatic copyright protection, more proactive strategies emerged.
While various popular free software licenses continue to leverage
copyright protection, in 2010 developer Arto Bendiken released the
Unlicense, an instrument designed to “dedicate any and all copyright
interest in the software to the public domain … in perpetuity of all
present and future rights.”139 More than 100,000 projects on GitHub
are made available under the terms of the Unlicense.140
These examples reveal that the motivations for abandonment
go beyond purely economic calculations. That’s not to say placing a
work in the public domain couldn’t redound to the author’s financial
benefit. A work that is widely available at no cost may increase an
author’s visibility, spark interest in other work, or lead to opportunities
for live performance or other paid services.141 Jason Rohrer, for
example, still makes money from the games he makes and dedicates
to the public domain by charging for access to the servers on which
they are played.142
136

Jennie Rose Halperin, CC0 at the Cleveland Museum of Art: 30,000 high quality
digital images now available, CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 23, 2019),
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Tom Shea, Free software - Free software is a junkyard of software spare parts,
INFOWORLD, June 23, 1983.
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Ben Balter, Open source license usage on GitHub.com, GitHub Blog (March 9,
2015), https://github.blog/2015-03-09-open-source-license-usage-on-github-com.
141
This is a classic “loss leader” where someone gives away something in the shortterm in the hope of making larger profits at a later time by stimulating demand and/or
creating consumer goodwill.
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See jasonrohrer, Comment to Open Letter to the Mobile Developers,
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Alternatively, placing a work in the public domain may bring
owners subjective satisfaction. Much empirical evidence has shown
that giving property away can bring greater subjective well-being than
hanging onto it for profit.143 Carol Highsmith’s donation of works to
the Library of Congress, which the Library itself called “one of the
greatest acts of generosity” in its history, falls into this category.144
Abandonment may also contribute to an author’s reputation or sense
of belonging within her community. Before the development of the
contemporary free software movement, for example, a community of
programmers sought to cede their code to the public domain.145
Beyond community norms, abandonment allows owners to express
and further their ideology, dedicating works to the public domain as a
political or cultural gesture.146
The mismatch between rational-choice predictions and the
reality of abandonment provides another illustration of the variety of
motivations that shapes the relationship between creators and their
works. Non-pecuniary interests spur not only the creation of new
works,147 but copyright enforcement as well.148 Abandonment is no
different. Rational choice alone cannot capture the variety of reasons
his games to the public domain, he has expressed frustration over adaptations of
those games that fail to provide him with attribution or falsely suggest his
involvement. Id.
143
Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More, IOWA L. REV. (2018) (collecting
studies showing that other-oriented uses of property, such as giving to charities,
tends to increase subjective well-being more than self-oriented uses).
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https://hyperallergic.com/314079/photographer-files-1-billion-suit-against-gettyfor-licensing-her-public-domain-images/.
145
See Unlicense supra note 139.
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Cf. Rachelle Hampton, Broadly’s New “Gender Spectrum” Photo Library Will
Change How the World Sees Trans People, Slate.com, March 26, 2019 (describing
an open-access stock photo archive designed to make it easier for users to include
images of gender non-binary people in their depictions of everyday life).
147
This is true for both professionals and hobbyists. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE
EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2014) (interviewing creators to reveal a variety of motivations far
beyond economic self-interest); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan
Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997) (outlining the
culture of fan fiction and its relationship to law).
148
Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 63 (showing that infringement lawsuits are
often motivated by moral considerations rather than purely economic ones); John
Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2018) (cataloguing
numerous copyright infringement lawsuits designed only to suppress expression the
owner dislikes).
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that that owners abandon their works. This point will be crucial when
we turn to optimizing abandonment in Part IV.
The social costs of abandoning copyrights are the opposite of
those accompanying physical property abandonment. While
abandoning chattels tends to benefit owners and to externalize costs to
society, abandoning copyrights appears to be costly only to owners
while conferring significant benefits to society. Despite this inverse
cost-benefit equation, abandonment—or at least attempts at it—occurs
with surprising frequency. As the next Part reveals, however, the law
of abandonment frustrates both rights holder and potential users of
their works.
III. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT ABANDONMENT
As Part II revealed, a surprising number of copyright holders seek
to abandon their works, even works of nontrivial value. But even for
copyright holders who prefer abandonment, the legal mechanisms by
which a work can be fully abandoned remain far from clear. The
Copyright Act contains no abandonment provision; the Copyright
Office, while accepting notices of abandonment, declines to weigh in
on their legal effect; and although the courts generally agree on the
basic doctrinal framework for abandonment, their application of that
test has been inconsistent and unpredictable. Not only does a copyright
holder committed to abandoning her work lack a clear, reliable
mechanism for parting with her creation, but the copyright system
lacks any broadly accessible record of abandoned works, further
undermining the practical effectiveness of abandonment. In this Part,
we outline the statutory, administrative, and judicial treatment of
abandonment. We focus particular attention on the ways in which
courts have struggled to articulate and consistently apply a clear
abandonment standard.
A. Statutory Silence
The Copyright Act of 1976 says nothing about abandonment.149
Neither do the Acts of 1909 or 1790.150 The failure to explicitly
address abandonment is perhaps understandable under the pre-1976

149

The terms “abandon” and “abandonment” do not appear in Title 17 of the United
States Code.
150
35 Stat. 1075 et seq. (1909); 1 Stat. 124 et seq. (1790).
36

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

regimes, given their opt-in structure. Under those earlier Acts, owners
who did not want a copyright could simply decline to engage in the
formalities necessary for federal protection. But under the 1976 Act,
copyrights vests automatically. The resulting proliferation of
copyrights makes the lack of any abandonment mechanism a more
consequential absence.
Prior to the 1976 Act, federal statutory copyright protected works
only if they were published with proper notice. If an author published
a work within the meaning of the statute without adequate notice, they
forfeited federal copyright and the work entered the public domain.151
Although Congress may not have designed these forfeiture rules with
abandonment in mind, an author determined to abandon their work
could easily leverage copyright’s formal requirements to do so.152
They simply needed to publish the work without notice, and it would
be free for all to use. In effect, copyright formalities created a statutory
back door for abandonment.
But as of January 1, 1978—the effective date of the 1976 Act—
federal law protects all copyrightable works from the instant of their
creation, regardless of whether or not they are published. Any work of
authorship sufficient to satisfy the low bar of originality is imbued
with copyright protection from the moment it is fixed in a tangible

151

See Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“If the owner failed to satisfy the Act's requirements, the published work was
interjected irrevocably into the public domain precluding any subsequent protection
of the work under the 1909 Copyright Act.”). In response to the harsh consequences
of publication without proper notice, courts developed the distinction between
general and limited publication. The latter did not result in forfeiture. See White v.
Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1952) (“a limited publication which
communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a
limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or
sale… does not result in loss of the author's common-law right to his manuscript”).
152
The legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals some congressional awareness of
the use of copyright formalities to intentionally relinquish rights. To the extent
Congress recognized this practice, it sought to address it by reducing or eliminating
opportunities for losing copyright, intentional or not. See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 151,
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5767 (noting that the deposit requirement “resulted in
many artists choosing to forfeit copyright protection rather than bear the expense of
depositing ‘two copies of the best edition.’); see also id. at 147 (“omission of notice,
whether intentional or unintentional, does not invalidate the copyright if either of
two conditions is met…”
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medium153 Initially, an owner could still lose a vested copyright upon
publication without proper notice under the 1976 Act, although this
omission could be cured.154 But since the United States enacted
legislation in 1989 to comply with the Berne Convention, notice is no
longer required to either secure or maintain copyright protection.155
Such a system is bound to give rise to a massive number of
unintentional, if not affirmatively unwanted, copyrights. One might
reasonably expect then that this shift from an opt-in copyright
regime—one that required some affirmative steps to secure federal
protection—to an automatic system—one that protects all eligible
works by default—would provide some mechanism for opting out of
copyright’s entitlements. But the 1976 Act is silent on whether or how
a copyright holder may dedicate their work to the public domain or
otherwise abandon their ownership interest in a work.156 Whatever the
standards or procedures are for abandoning copyrights, they are not
found in the Act itself.
B. Administrative Agnosticism
The U.S. Copyright Office, housed within the Library of
Congress, is the administrative body charged with, among other
duties, registering copyrights and recording transfers and other
transactions relating to copyrighted works. Stretching back to the late
nineteenth century, the Copyright Department, as it was then known,
has played an important role in administering the various aspects of
the copyright system. As copyright law has grown increasingly
complex, the rules, practices, and responsibilities of the Office have
expanded apace.157 The Office has not only defined rules relating to
the formal and substantive requirements for registration, compliant
notice, and sufficient deposit of copies, but it has overseen and
collected statutory licenses, and weighed in on a range of questions of
copyright policy as well.
Beginning in 1973, the Office began to collect and publish its
153

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) (Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression).
154
Id. § 405(a)
155
Id.
156
Id. §§ 204 & 205 (2018).
157
See Aaron Perzanowski, The Limits of Copyright Office Expertise, 33 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 733 (2018).
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various policies and procedures in the Compendium of U.S. Copyright
Office Practices. The most recent edition, consistent with the two prior
major revisions, addresses abandonment. The Compendium provides
that copyright holders may “record an affidavit, declaration,
statement, or any other document purporting to abandon a claim to
copyright or any of the exclusive rights.”158 Such a document “should
identify … the author(s), title(s), and registration number(s) for the
works (if any).”159 And it “should state that the rights specified in the
document have been abandoned.”160 Notices of abandonment are
subject to the same recordation fees that apply to assignments or other
transfers of ownership, currently $105 for a single work.161 Crucially,
however, the Copyright Office takes no position on whether a duly
recorded document that meets these criteria and “purports” to abandon
a work is effective.162 “The Office will record an abandonment …
without offering any opinion as to the legal effect of the document.”163
158

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 2311 (3d ed. 2017). See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 12.4.2 (1973) (“Although there is no provision in
the copyright law for abandoning a copyright, the Copyright Office will record an
affidavit or signed statement of abandonment without offering any opinion as to its
legal effect.”); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 1507.14 (2d ed. 1984) (“There is no provision in the copyright statute
for abandoning a copyright or copyright claim or any of the rights therein. However,
the Copyright Office will record an affidavit or other statement, signed by all of the
copyright owners, purporting to abandon the copyright, without expressing any
opinion concerning its legal effect.”).
159
Id. The Compendium (Second) required “clear words of present abandonment.”
Id. § 12.4.2.
160
COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 2311.
161
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CALCULATING FEES FOR RECORDING DOCUMENTS AND
NOTICES OF TERMINATION IN THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(2014),
https://www.copyright.gov/fls/sl04d.pdf. In contrast, copyright protection under the
1976 Act is automatic and free, and optional registration costs as little as $35 for a
single work.
162
Section 805 of Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 refers to
“public domain computer software” and provides for the donation of copies for the
Machine Readable Collections Reading Room of the Library of Congress. Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 5089. According to the Copyright
Office “[p]ublic domain computer software means software which has been publicly
distributed with an explicit disclaimer of copyright protection by the copyright
owner.” 37 C.F.R. § 201.26(b)(3). This suggests that, at least for software, federal
law recognizes abandonment. See STEPHEN FISHMAN, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN § 6.02.
163
COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 2311.
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Once received, the Office creates an online public record of the
notice.164 But it does not make the content of the notice of
abandonment available online. Nor does it cross-reference the record
with the corresponding copyright registration or maintain a database
of abandoned works.165
Our search of Copyright Office records uncovered 190 notices
of abandonment filed between 1978 and 2018. On average, fewer than
five notices were recorded per year over that four-decade period. In
contrast, the Copyright Office recorded more than 21,000
assignments, licenses, and other transactions in 2018 alone, only three
of which were notices of abandonment.166 For reasons explored below,
we note an overall downward trend in works subject to notices of
abandonment. They peaked in 1980 with 598 works, dwindling to just
a trickle today.167
We obtained copies of 187 of the 190 abandonment notices.168
Those documents reveal considerable variation in the rationales
offered by abandoning owners. The Office does not require copyright
owners to provide any reasons for abandoning their works, so the vast
majority are silent on this front. But several of the notices volunteer
information that reveals owners’ reasoning. Some abandon copyrights
in what appear to be good-faith efforts to acknowledge the invalidity
of their copyrights. One owner filed a notice after discovering a
preexisting work,169 while another did so upon determining that their
work was ineligible for protection.170 Others seek to correct clerical
errors.171 Still others abandon to settle copyright disputes172 or to
comply with court orders.173 For example, in an antitrust case brought
164

Id.
Since the online record includes the name and registration number of only the
first work listed in a notice, those records do not fully capture even those works
subject to a notice filed with the Office. Id.
166
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018 at 7,
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf.
167
There were three such works in 2018; eight in 2017; and none in 2016.
168
Because these notices are not available online, this required a visit to the
Copyright Office archives in Washington, D.C.
169
1998 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 781 (1984).
170
1955 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 162 (1982).
171
See, e.g., 1733 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 154 (1979); 1737 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 26
(1979).
172
1883 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 128 (1981); 1909 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 333 (1982).
173
2953 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 563 (1993); 2236 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 436 (1986).
165
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by a cake decoration supplier against two larger competitors, the court
ordered the defendants to “prepare, execute and file with the Register
of Copyrights notices of abandonment of all claims to copyright in
[various decorations and related materials].”174
By contrast, some copyright holders abandon their works out of a
sense of altruism or a desire to reach a broader audience. When Bruce
MacNaul abandoned his copyrights on various legal publications, he
noted his “intention that any person be able to utilize these works and
the information contained therein.”175 And when Robert Lynott
abandoned the copyright in his book on weather forecasting, he
expressed his “desire to remove the obstacle of copyright [because]
[d]issemination is more important than money.”176
Other copyright holders were motivated by economic
considerations, in particular avoiding the manufacturing clause.177
Under now-repealed section 601 of the 1976 Act, it was unlawful to
import or distribute copies of English language literary works unless
those copies were manufactured in the United States or Canada.178 The
manufacturing clause was nakedly protectionist, designed to insulate
domestic printers and publishers from low-cost international
competition. However, since it applied only to works protected by
U.S. copyright, the clause could be circumvented by abandoning rights
in a work.
So where concern over unauthorized duplication was low, some
companies chose to forego copyright protection and print copies of
their works overseas. Under the regulations of the day, an unlimited
number of copies manufactured abroad could be imported on a
showing “that a statement of abandonment of copyright has been filed
and recorded in the copyright office and the notice of copyright is
completely obliterated from the works sought to be imported.”179 For
example, a company that prints hundreds of thousands of computer
174

Parrish's Cake Decorating Supplies V. Wilton Enterprises, No. 75 C 4400, 1984
WL 2942 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1984); see also 2068 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 49 (1984).
175
1955 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 162 (1982).
176
2798 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 334 (1992).
177
2024 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 251 (1983) (explaining that copyright in religious
pamphlets was being abandoned to permit importation of material printed
internationally).
178
17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1985).
179
Authors League of Am. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 221 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 19
C.F.R. § 133.51(b)(3) (1985)).

41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

manuals might be willing to part with their copyrights if international
printing offers significant cost savings.180
In terms of the number of works abandoned, the four-decade
average is about 34 works per year.181 From 1978 though 1986, the
final year of the manufacturing clause, owners filed to abandon an
average of 110 works per year. From 1987 until 2018, that average
dropped to just over 12 works per year.182 This suggests that the ability
to manufacture and print copies internationally drove some
abandonment decisions.
Finally, copyright holders employ a variety of language to convey
abandonment in the filed notices. Many simply state that they “hereby
abandon” a particular work. Others expressed their intent to “abandon,
surrender and disclaim all right, title, and interest in and to [the
work]”183 or “irrevocably surrender, relinquish, abandon, dedicate to
the public and inject into the public domain any and all copyrights;”184
or “irrevocably [] relinquish and abandon [their] Registrations and the
claims described therein”185 Each of these phrasings seem to establish
unambiguously the copyright holder’s intent to abandon their work.
But as the next section demonstrates, courts have struggled to define
and apply a precise standard for abandonment.

180

Hewlett Packard, for example, abandoned its copyrights in 246 works in 1984
including various owner’s manuals and instructional materials. 2095 COPYRIGHT
RECORD. 158 (1985); id. at 163.
181
Although many of the notices identify a single work to be abandoned, others list
dozens or even hundreds of such works. Id., 1824 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 186 (1980).
182
A similar trend is visible by examining the number of notices filed. Over 40 years,
owners filed an average of 4.6 notices each year. In the manufacturing clause era,
that average was nearly 7 notices per year. In the years that followed, the average
dropped to fewer than 4 notices annually. Two outlier years in which the same
copyright holder filed separate notices for multiple works drove the number higher.
183
3031 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 102 (1984).
184
3426 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 811 (1999).
185
3620 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 415 (2012). One distinction that emerges from the
notices is that between the intent to abandon a work and the intent to abandon a
registration. Often the work and registration are referred to interchangeably, or they
are abandoned in tandem. But in some instances, copyright holders claim to abandon
a registration while reserving rights in the underlying work. See, e.g., 2784
COPYRIGHT RECORD. 462 (1992) (insisting that abandonment of registration “in no
way constitutes an abandonment of the work”); 3422 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 930
(1999); 3596 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 345 (2010); 9952 COPYRIGHT RECORD. 366
(2018).
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C. Judicial Uncertainty
Given the absence of any explicit or reliable statutory or
administrative mechanism for abandoning copyrights, courts facing
claims of copyright abandonment have borrowed from the law of
personal property. In both contexts, abandonment is the intentional
relinquishment of a legal interest as manifested by some overt act. But
the abandonment of rights in intangible works is, at best, an imperfect
analog to the abandonment of physical assets.
To more fully understand how courts conceptualize, interpret, and
apply the doctrine of abandonment in the copyright context, we have
identified and analyzed what we believe are every state and federal
opinion containing a substantive analysis of what courts term
copyright “abandonment.” In all, that dataset includes 293
decisions.186 The earliest dates from 1834, and the most recent were
decided in 2019. Of these 293 decisions, however, 131 exclusively
address questions of copyright forfeiture, rather than abandonment
proper. Of the remaining 162 decisions that squarely address
abandonment, only 17 found that the works in question had, in fact,
been abandoned. In addition, we identified a handful of decisions that,
while not containing the term “abandonment,” nonetheless offer
analyses that track the doctrine that emerges from the cases.
Our examination of these decisions suggests that, not unlike their
chattel property counterparts, the copyright abandonment cases reveal
considerable confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency. First, courts
have failed to reliably distinguish between abandonment and a number
of related, but conceptually and practically distinct doctrines. In part,
this confusion reflects the extent to which abandonment was
doctrinally intertwined with the formalities that prevailed in copyright
law prior to the 1976 Act. Since then, courts have delineated some of
these doctrines more clearly. But others remain muddled. Second,
aside from the bare recitation of the common law test for
abandonment, a fully-realized and consistently-applied doctrine has
yet to take shape. Given the paucity of cases where abandonment
defenses prevail, it remains difficult to predict with much confidence
which acts courts will deem sufficient evidence of the subjective intent

186

We identified these by searching Westlaw for “copyright /5 abandon!” That
search yielded 437 cases. We then manually reviewed the results and removed more
than 100 false positives. Those included decisions that made passing references to
“abandonment” and those that involved abandonment of non-copyright interests.
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to abandon.
Both the doctrinal conflation and the absence of guidance as to
divining intent obscure the path to effective abandonment. That fact
frustrates rights holders contemplating abandonment, introduces
uncertainty for users of plausibly abandoned works, and leaves courts
poorly equipped to resolve disputes between them.
1. Distinguishing Adjacent Doctrines
Before we examine how courts have resolved genuine cases of
alleged abandonment, it is necessary to distinguish abandonment from
a cluster of related doctrines. This clarification is important because
courts are often imprecise in their terminology. And that imprecision
obfuscates the contours of abandonment. For instance, courts
frequently refer to “abandonment” when cases actually present a
question of forfeiture. At other times, courts blur the line between
abandonment and a number of related, but distinct doctrines including
acquiescence, waiver, estoppel, and implied license. So before
explaining what abandonment is, we begin by explaining what it isn’t.
Copyright abandonment—the intentional relinquishing of
rights in a work as manifested through some overt act—is closely
related to forfeiture—the unintentional loss of copyright due to a
failure to comply with some formal requirement. Most commonly,
forfeiture occurred when a would-be copyright holder engaged in a
general publication without proper notice of copyright.
Abandonment and forfeiture are different in crucial respects,
however. Abandonment requires the owner’s intention to give up their
exclusive rights in the work, while forfeiture divests the copyright
holder by operation of law irrespective of their intent. But courts
frequently use these terms interchangeably, referring to
“abandonment” when the case actually involves forfeiture.187 This
mistake is understandable given that under the pre-1976 regime works
could be abandoned by publication without notice—the very same act
that constituted the bulk of forfeiture cases. But the two doctrines are
not equivalent. An author who tries but fails to provide proper notice
may forfeit their copyright, but the absence of such notice alone does
187

See, e.g., Koppel v. Downing, 11 App. D.C. 93, 1897 WL 17708 (D.C. Cir. 1897);
Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 F. 247 (2d Cir. 1915); Atl. Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27
F.2d 556 (D. Mass. 1928).
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not establish an intent to abandon.188 Conversely, an author who
makes a limited, as opposed to general, publication does not
automatically forfeit copyright, but they may have abandoned it if
intent can be established.189
Related to the conflation of abandonment and forfeiture is the
tendency to treat both as synonymous with dedication to the public
domain.190 Public domain status is best understood as the legal
consequence of both abandonment and forfeiture. While the term
“dedication” implies some degree of intent, courts often refer to
forfeiture as a public domain dedication.191 In any case, dedication is
not a distinct doctrine with its own legal standard. Notably, copyrights
in certain foreign works that were in the public domain were restored
by the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act in 1996 if they were forfeited,
but not if they were abandoned.192
Courts also confuse abandonment and waiver.193 The two
doctrines share some similarities. Both are concerned with a rights
holder’s intent, evidenced by some overt act, to cede some measure of
control over a work.194 But while abandonment works a full
188

Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 597–598 (2d Cir.
1951).
189
Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241,1248 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“limited
distribution, even if not widespread enough to effect a forfeiture, can, coupled with
the requisite intent, cause an abandonment.”).
190
Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1981)
(equating abandonment of dedication); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426
F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (equating failure to renew with abandonment and
dedication); Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine 393 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828).
191
See, e.g., Boucicault v Fox, 5 Blatchf. 87 (1862); Holmes v Hurst, 76 F. 757
(E.D.N.Y. 1896); RCA Mfg Co v Whiteman, 28 F.Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Public Affairs Associates Inc v Rickover, 177 F.Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959); Bartok v
Boosey And Hawkes Inc., 523 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1975).
192
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2018); See Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290
F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
193
Bubble Pony, Inc. v. Facepunch Studios Ltd., No. CV 15-601(DSD/FLN), 2017
WL 1379326 (D. Minn 2017); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., No. C 9320079 JW, 1995 WL 836331 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1995). But see Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinct analyses of waiver
and abandonment).
194
Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, 326 F. Supp. 3d 918, 929 (D. Ariz. 2018); but see
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Copyright also may be waived as the result of a particular act, even if waiver was
not the intended result”). Notably the case cited in Veeck for this proposition, Norma
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relinquishment of copyright against all users of the work, waiver is
more narrowly tailored; it limits the copyright holder’s rights only as
to the particular party to whom the intent was communicated.195
Moreover, while waiver can be partial, applying only to some rights
enjoyed by the copyright holder, most authority agrees abandonment
implicates all of the copyright holder’s rights.196
Estoppel and acquiescence compound the problem. As the
Supreme Court recently clarified, estoppel applies “when a copyright
owner engages in intentionally misleading representations concerning
his abstention from suit, and the alleged infringer detrimentally relies
on the copyright owner's deception.”197 Acquiescence—best
understood as a type of estoppel—turns on express or implied
assurances made by the copyright holder to the defendant that it will
not assert its copyright.198 This focus on reliance distinguishes
estoppel and acquiescence from abandonment. And like waiver, even
if estoppel or acquiescence can be established, the copyright holder
retains ownership and the ability to enforce its copyright against the
rest of the world. Nonetheless, courts have sometimes failed to clearly
delineate these doctrines.199
Finally, courts have even confused abandonment with implied

Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, concerned the question of forfeiture. 51 F.3d 45,
48 (5th Cir. 1995) (“by failing to adhere to the statutory formalities—i.e., the
copyright notice requirement—the Littles forfeited whatever copyrights they claim
to have had in the ribbon flowers”), demonstrating that waiver is confused with
forfeiture as well.
195
Id.
196
See infra note 256 and accompanying text. See also WILLIAM PATRY, 2 PATRY
ON COPYRIGHT § 5:157 (“Waiver, properly construed, refers only to a decision not
to enforce rights against a particular party and may be contrasted with abandonment,
which concerns a decision to relinquish all (or arguably some) rights in the work as
against the world.”)
197
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684–85 (2014).
198
Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1991).
199
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(discussing estoppel, abandonment, and acquiescence without articulating the
differences between them); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys.
Corp., No. C 93-20079 JW, 1995 WL 836331 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1995) (failing to
distinguish abandonment, waiver, and acquiescence); Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corps.,
756 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (failing to distinguish abandonment and
acquiescence); Am. Metro. Enters. of N. Y. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d
903 (2d Cir. 1968) (failing to distinguish abandonment and acquiescence).
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license.200 An implied license is created when the conduct of two
parties and the surrounding circumstances “demonstrate that the
parties intended that the work would be used for a specific purpose.”201
The right to engage in a particular use established through a contextsensitive examination of the interactions between two parties is a far
cry from the sweeping loss of copyright entailed by abandonment.
Moreover, implied licenses are generally revocable. Abandonment, by
contrast, is forever.
As the discussion above makes clear, courts have frequently failed
to accurately distinguish abandonment, its elements, and its
consequences from other related doctrines.202 Having shown what
abandonment is not, we now try to outline as clearly as possible what
abandonment is and what evidence courts have deemed sufficient to
establish it.
2. The Unsettled Black Letter of Abandonment
Most courts agree that copyright abandonment requires an
intent to relinquish rights in a work, as manifested by some overt act
by the rights holder.203 The prevailing view is that mere inaction in the
200

See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 647-8
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (MP3tunes contends that by offering a promotional download from
an authorized website, Plaintiffs either abandoned their copyrights altogether or
authorized downloads outside of the promotional context. In either event, MP3tunes
has the burden to prove the existence of such a broad implied license.”); Microstar
v. Formgen, Inc, 942 F. Supp. 1312, 1317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (Microstar “contends
it has an implied license to use the screen scenes and screen saver images in any way
that it chooses. The gravamen of this argument is that by encouraging users of Duke
3D to create new levels and share them with the world, movants in effect granted an
open license to use any copyrighted material, such that they have waived or
abandoned any claim to copyright protection.”).
201
Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558–59 (9th Cir. 1990)
202
See Armstrong, supra note 6, at 391-92.
203
See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d
Cir. 1951); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004);
Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998); Hampton v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960). But courts still occasionally
articulate other standards. See e.g. Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, 326 F. Supp. 3d 918,
929 (D. Ariz. 2018) (“[W]aiver or abandonment of copyright ‘occurs only if there is
an intent by the copyright proprietor to surrender rights in his work.’”); Basic Books,
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1540 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
plaintiff's acquiescence in the defendant's infringing acts may, if continued for a
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face of unauthorized use is insufficient,204 but some courts have
suggested otherwise.205 This test mirrors the one applied in chattel
property abandonment cases, from which it was borrowed.206 Despite
the general consensus with respect to the appropriate test, the
abandonment decisions reveal that courts struggle to draw consistent
and predictable lines, leaving copyright holders uncertain about how
to abandon their works and potential users guessing about their
copyright status.
As we detail below, courts have confronted—and occasionally
accepted—a range of overt acts as proof of the intent to abandon a
copyright. Those acts tend to sort themselves into two categories. On
the one hand, we have explicit notices or statements disclaiming
copyright. On the other, we find a range of ambiguous behaviors that
are open to diverging interpretations. The outcomes in these cases
provide little guidance to future litigants. Even decisions addressing
explicit verbal disclaimers—what should be the most straightforward
cases—fail to yield a single, consistent standard. Cases addressing
more ambiguous conduct offer even less certainty.
a. Verbal Disclaimers
A number of courts have considered whether oral or written
statements that purport to disclaim copyright amount to abandonment.
For the most explicit statements, courts have generally found that
abandonment has occurred. But since abandonment turns on the
subjective intent of the rights holder, even verbal communications are
often open to competing interpretations. In some instances, we
identify courts that were too eager to find abandonment. Others were
reluctant to deem a work abandoned despite what we believe is clear
sufficient period of time and if manifested by overt acts, result in an abandonment
of copyright.”).
204
Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960).
205
Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002) (“there
must be either an act, or a failure to act, from which we can readily infer an intent to
abandon the right.”).
206
See, e.g., Griffis v. Davidson Cnty. Metro. Gov't, 164 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tenn.
2005) (“[A] complainant... must show both intent to abandon for the stated
limitations and some external act or omission by which the intent to abandon is
effectuated.”).
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evidence of intent.
Bates v Keirsey presents an easy case of abandonment. The
authors and copyright holders of the book Please Understand Me
wanted to import copies from Hong Kong. In order to avoid the
manufacturing clause, Bates and Keirsey signed a document entitled
“Abandonment of Copyright” that read in part “We hereby abandon
our copyright to the book titled Please Understand Me...”207 The court
was convinced that the “evidence unequivocally establishe[d]” that
Bates engaged in an overt act demonstrating his intent to abandon.208
Likewise, the court dismissed Carol Highsmith’s claims when she
sued Getty Images for falsifying copyright information.209 The stock
photo firm charged for licenses to use photos that Highsmith made
freely available through the Library of Congress.210 Claims under §
1202 require an “intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal
infringement.”211 But as part of her gift to the Library, Highsmith
“dedicate[d] to the public all rights, including copyrights, throughout
the world … in this collection.”212 As a result, the works were in the
public domain, and infringement was impossible.
In Hadady Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the publisher of a
newsletter included the following statement in its copyright notice:
“The information contained in this letter is protected by U.S. copyright
laws through noon EST on the 2d day after its release….” Hadady
denied that this statement expressed an intent to abandon, a contention
the court concluded “fl[ew] in the face of the only possible meaning”
207

Bates v. Keirsey, No. D041368, 2004 WL 2850153 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2004).
We Shall Overcome Found. & Butler Films v. Richmond Org., Inc., 330 F. Supp.
3d 960 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (as part of settlement, copyright holders “agree[d] that
hereafter they will not claim copyright in the melody or lyrics of any verse of the
song ‘We Shall Overcome’”); J2F Prods., Inc. v Sarrow, No. CV097000JSTFFMX,
2011 WL 13185746 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (counterclaimant explicitly abandoned
copyright via written notice of abandonment); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of
Am., Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding abandonment after
copyright holder “confirmed that a third party ‘was wrong in believing’ he needed a
letter of authorization … before he could copy a recording ‘when the recording in
question is public domain.’”).
209
Order, First Amended Complaint, Highsmith v. Getty Images, No. 16-cv-05924
(S.D.N.Y.).
210
First Amended Complaint, Highsmith v. Getty Images, No. 16-cv-05924
(S.D.N.Y.).
211
17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2018).
212
First Amended Complaint, Exhibit I, Highsmith v. Getty Images, No. 16-cv05924 (S.D.N.Y.).
208
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of the notice.213 As in Bates and Highsmith, the court found
abandonment on the basis of an unambiguous statement offered freely
by the copyright holder.
But not all statements offer such clear evidence of intent. For
example, architect Paul Oravec entered building plans in a competition
to design the new World Trade Center.214 As a condition for entering
that competition, Oravec signed a letter “signifying [his] agreement
that [he] reserve[d] no patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or
other intellectual property rights in any of the material that forms or is
contained in [his] proposal.”215 This language is at best ambiguous. It
could be read to effectuate a broad abandonment, but is more plausibly
understood in context to effectuate a waiver of rights that extended
only to the entity running the contest, the counterparty in the
agreement. Oravec did not win the contest, but his designs were
allegedly copied by the Florida developers of the Trump Palace and
Trump Royale. When he sued for infringement, the court held he had
abandoned his copyright interests by virtue of his agreement to the
contest rules.216
Similarly, in Wyatt Technology Corp. v. Malvern Instruments
Inc. the predecessor in interest of the copyright holder distributed a
software program with a notice that read: “Currently, there are no
restrictions on this material. You may install it on as many PC systems
as you like, and you may distribute it freely to your colleagues.”217
The term “currently” would seem to preclude reading the language as
expressing an intent to abandon. Instead, it appears to reserve a right
to alter these permissive terms at a later date. Despite a witness who
testified that the developer “never intended to ‘abandon’” its rights,
the court determined the notice indicated an intent to abandon.218

213

Hadady Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (C.D. Cal.
1990)
214
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
215
Id. at 1154.
216
Id. at 1177–78.
217
Wyatt Tech. Corp. v. Malvern Instruments Inc., No. CV 07-08298DDP(MANX),
2009 WL 2365647 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009).
218
Id. See also Rouse v. Walter & Assocs. L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (finding abandonment where software was created with a tool that prohibited
privately owned software, where copyright notices did not mention plaintiff, but
rather plaintiff’s employer, plaintiff signed an agreement that referred to the program
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In other instances, however, courts have declined to find
abandonment despite seemingly clear statements by rights holders.
Melchizedek v Holt concerned the copyright in a meditation video.219
In an open letter, the creator of the video explained that he “let the
video go out to the world unrestrained. No control on the copyrighted
material. No money coming back to me from the videos.”220 He went
on to explain that he “never cared about the copyrights [and] wanted
the information to go out to the world.”221 Later he told workshop
attendees that he “do[es]n't care about copyrights or any of that stuff,
that doesn't matter.”222 Nonetheless, the court found the evidence
insufficient to establish abandonment.
As these cases demonstrate, even when copyright holders offer
oral or written disclaimers of rights, it is often difficult to predict
whether a court will find abandonment has occurred.223
b. Other Overt Acts
The overt act requirement may also be satisfied by conduct rather
than language. Defendants often point to some non-verbal act of the
owner that arguably expresses a desire to abandon a copyright. These
purported defenses are often implausible, and sometimes border on the
frivolous.224 Defendants have insisted copyrights were abandoned
when: a book went out of print,225 software was designated open

as property of plaintiff’s employer ISU, plaintiff claimed program was owned by
employer in a published article.).
219
Melchizedek v. Holt, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Ariz. 2011).
220
Id. at 1048.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
This lack of a clear standard may explain in part the current posture of the Furie
case. The creator of Pepe the Frog made a number of statements that could only
tepidly be understood to indicate abandonment, such as “I believe in supporting
people’s decisions to profit off Pepe.” Rather than resolving the issue as a matter of
law, though, the court simply punted the case to a jury, holding that the statements
did not clearly indicate intent to abandon (or its absence).
224
See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., No. 602CV1377ORL19KRS, 2004 WL
5486639 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2004); Covington Indus., Inc. v. Nichols, No. 02 CIV.
8037 (KTD), 2004 WL 784825 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004).
225
Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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source,226 images were uploaded to Wikimedia under a Creative
Commons license,227 works were shared on the internet,228 and a
program was broadcast on public television.229 These claims are all
substantively implausible because they confuse an owner’s making a
work accessible to the public on a limited basis with wholesale
relinquishment of control over the work. Courts are generally capable
of recognizing and rejecting these grasping efforts to establish
abandonment, but other conduct has resulted in less obvious
determinations.
Two cases illustrate the conceptual difficulty courts sometimes
face in applying a doctrine developed in the context of chattels to
intangible works. When it comes to chattels, the physical disposition
of the property often offers strong indications of intent. A couch
placed unattended on the sidewalk is a reasonably clear sign of the
owner’s intent to abandon it. But under copyright law, ownership of
any physical embodiment of a work is distinct from ownership of the
copyright in the intangible work.230 This creates inevitable doctrinal
tension as an owner’s actions and intentions with respect to copies
may not carry over to the work embodied in those copies.
Pushman v New York Graphic Society epitomizes this tension.
The plaintiff sold the defendant an original painting and sued for
infringement after it created reproductions.231 The court found that
“the absolute sale and delivery of the painting without any condition,
reservation or qualification of any kind, to a state-owned public
institution where it has been displayed for a long period of time,
constitute an abandonment of all the plaintiff's rights and a publication
and dedication to public use free for enjoyment and reproduction by

226

Blizzard Entm’t Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., No. 3:15-CV-04084-CRB,
2017 WL 2118342 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2017).
227
Philpot v. World Publ. Library Ass’n, No. CV 18-00057 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL
3422777 (D. Haw. June 25, 2018).
228
Rosen v. Martin, No. CV120657ABCFMOX, 2012 WL 12845103 (C.D. Cal.
June 7, 2012); Dolores Press, Inc. v. Robinson, 766 Fed. App’x 449 (9th Cir. 2019);
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 370 F. Supp. 3d 478 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
229
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
230
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018); but see Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc. 25 N.Y.S.2d 32
(Sup. Ct. 1941)
231
Id.
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anybody.”232 The court treated the owner’s relinquishment of control
over the copy—the painted canvas—as expressing relinquishment of
control over the work—the abstract image embodied in the painting.
This conflation of the copy with the work has been abrogated by the
1976 Copyright Act.233
Likewise, in Pacific and Southern Co. v Duncan, the court
interpreted the destruction of a videotape recording as a demonstration
of the rights holder’s intent to abandon its copyright.234 There, a
television station sued a television monitoring service that recorded
and sold a copy of a segment from the station’s news broadcast.
Although the station retained copies of pre-taped segments, it
generally destroyed all copies of its news programs soon after they
were broadcast. According to the court, the station’s “destruction of
its broadcast videotapes is certainly” an overt act that “evidences an
intention to abandon [its] copyright.”235 Here, too, the court inferred
from an owner’s destructive act with respect to a copy that they had
an intent to abandon the work embodied in that copy. Without
additional evidence of intent, this inference is untenable. The station
may have deleted the tape for a number of reasons. It may have lacked
the space necessary to archive every broadcast, example. Certainly,
nothing about its private archiving practices communicated to the
defendant its intent to abandon.
In other cases, despite the generally agreed upon rule that failures
to act are insufficient to show abandonment,236 some courts have made
questionable inferences on the basis of rights holders’ silence. One
court held that an author’s failure to object when a psychiatrist sent
thousands of copies of a poem to his patients resulted in
abandonment.237 Another found that the failure to object to publication
of a song and its widespread use for decades worked an

232

Id. But see Patterson v. J. S. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 119 F. 451 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902)
(finding no abandonment after the sale of printing plates because “they were mere
pieces of metal, which became the property of the purchaser, but gave him no right
to publish the copyrighted work which could be printed from them.”).
233
See Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, Reconciling Personal & Intellectual
Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211 (2015); 17 USC § 201 (2018).
234
Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983)..
235
Id.
236
Cf. Preseault v. United States - 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
237
Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F.Supp. 1241 (ND Ill 1975). In addition, the
author described the poem as a gift to the world in his diary. Id.
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abandonment.238 And a third found abandonment at least in part on the
basis of the copyright holder discontinuing publication of its
magazine.239 These cases seem to disregard the overt act requirement
entirely, mistaking an owner’s inaction with respect to their copyright
for an affirmative intention to place it into the public domain.240
And even when copyright holders do engage in some overt act that
could be construed as abandoning the work, courts are prone to
overstating their intent. In Seshadri v. Kasraian, the Seventh Circuit
considered a claim of infringement brought by a professor against a
former graduate student who published a research paper solely under
his own name.241 Having concluded that the two were joint authors,
the court had no need to resolve the question of abandonment.242
Nonetheless, Judge Posner asserted that “had Seshadri authorized
Kasraian or the Journal of Applied Physics to publish the article under
Kasraian's sole name, that would be abandonment—a statement or
other act that demonstrates an intention of relinquishing any copyright
interest in a work. Authorizing another to publish under his sole name
would amount to a public disclaimer of authorship.”243 Posner’s
dictum represents a different kind of conflation, confusing attribution
and abandonment. The former is about credit; the latter is about
relinquishing copyright. One can seek the latter while forgoing the
former.
Some defendants have argued that owners who file works with
public agencies have abandoned their copyrights, but courts have
rightly tended to disagree.244 For example, an architect who submitted
238

Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co., 48 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass. 1942). See Stuff
v. E. C. Publ’ns, Inc., 342 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1965). Although stuff does not use the
term “abandonment,” the court concluded that the work was dedicated to the public
domain, in part, because the copyright holder was “derelict” in preventing infringing
uses.
239
Pearson v. Washingtonian Pub. Co., 98 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev’d by
Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) (addressing only the
question of forfeiture).
240
Copyright, unlike trademark and trade secret law, imposes no obligation to use a
work in order to establish or maintain protection. See Hrdy and Lemley.
241
Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997).
242
Id. (as joint authors, both parties were entitled to license reproduction of the
article on a non-exclusive basis, subject only to an obligation to account to the other
co-author for any revenue generated)
243
Id.
244
Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 762, 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (“the pretence that it
became a public document from being deposited in the public office, was entirely
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plans in order to secure a building permit did not intend to abandon
copyright in the design.245 One potential exception to this general rule
is presented in Korzybski v Underwood and Underwood.246 There the
plaintiff sued for infringement of his “model … illustrating thought
processes and formulating scientific information … consisting of
pieces of various shapes of geometric design, containing numerous
holes and connected by strings attached to pegs.”247 Crucially, the
model embodied the invention described in Korzybski’s patent for an
“Educational Appliance.”248 As a result, the Second Circuit deemed
the copyright invalid.
On one reading of the case, Korzybski engaged in general
publication of his design when he submitted his application to the
Patent Office.249 Presumably, that publication failed to comply with
the formal requirements of the federal copyright protection, although
the court was silent on that question. Although the court did not invoke
the term “abandonment,” we think the better reading focuses on
Korzybski’s intentional relinquishment of rights in light of the
disclosure requirements of patent law. As the court explained, “when
Korzybski filed his application and received his patent, he made a full
disclosure of his invention and dedicated it to the public, save for the
right to make, use, and vend it during the period for which the patent
gave him that monopoly.”250
untenable.”). One case sometimes cited as an example of abandonment is Heine v.
Appleton, 11 F. Cas. 1031, 1032 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857). There an artist on
Commodore Perry's naval mission to Japan was a deemed a government employee
whose work was in the public domain by virtue of that fact. But we think the case is
better understood as one denying copyright to federal government works. See
FISHMAN, supra note 162 § 6.02 (describing Heine as an abandonment case); but see
PATRY, supra note 196 § 4:57 (describing Heine as a case about government works).
245
Smith v. Paul 174 Cal. App. 2d 744 (1959); see also Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 744 (1959) (depositing chart with the Navy did not commit it to the public
domain).
246
Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929).
247
Id.
248
U.S. Patent No. 1,539,194 (issued May 26, 1925).
249
36 F.2d at 729 (“The filing of the application for the patent, including, of course,
the diagrams, was a publication that entitled anyone to copy the drawings.”).
250
Regardless of the appropriate reading of Korzybski, we think it unlikely that
courts today would deem copyrightable material abandoned purely by virtue of its
inclusion in a patent application or an issued patent. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals rejected the doctrine of election, which required applicants to choose
between design patent and copyright protection. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389
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These cases illustrate that it is usually difficult to reasonably draw
an inference about an author’s intentions with respect to the work by
examining their behavior with respect to the copy in which that work
is embodied. Thus, outside of circumstances in which filing,
disclosing, or publishing a work is inconsistent with copyright
protection as a matter of established law—as in Korzybski—we argue
that courts should not treat non-verbal conduct as evidence of
abandonment. As all of these cases illustrate, the disposition of copies
is rarely indicative of copyright holder intent with respect to the
underlying work. Moreover, since copyright law grants rights holders
wide latitude to license their works, even impliedly, it is difficult to
distinguish contingent permission to use a work from a relinquishment
of rights. And given the permanent consequences of abandonment,
courts should maintain a high bar for evidence of intent.251 Insisting
on verbal expressions of abandonment is the best way to
simultaneously facilitate abandonment when it is intended and to
avoid it when it isn’t.
c. Partial Abandonment
Courts are divided over the question of whether an owner can
abandon some, but not all, of their interest in a work, adding to the
uncertainty surrounding abandonment. Conceptually, this question is
not unique to copyright abandonment. We could imagine, for example,
an owner who abandons the right to sit on an old couch, but not the
right to sleep on it, or parts with napping rights on weekends, but not
weekdays. But the law is generally hostile to those sorts of servitudes
on chattels even if they could be enforced as a practical matter.252
While contract law could accommodate such arrangements, the law of

(C.C.P.A. 1974). And courts have generally grown accustomed to overlapping
intellectual property protections. See Christopher Buccafusco, Mark A. Lemley, &
Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75, 128-130 (2018) (criticizing
this trend).
251
See Armstrong, supra note 6, at 395 (“Judicial reluctance to impose such severe
consequences, absent the most unequivocal indication that such was the author's
intent, may do much to explain the comparative scarcity of cases finding
abandonment of copyright.”).
252
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008);
Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80
TENN. L. REV. 235 (2013).
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property generally, and abandonment in particular, are tools poorly
suited for the job.
Unlike ownership of chattels, copyright interests are infinitely
divisible. This distinction is a function of both their intangible nature
and an explicit policy choice reflected in the Copyright Act.253
Copyright interests are routinely divided and subdivided—sometimes
resulting in onionskin-thin rights. One party may hold an exclusive
license to publish a book, with another party holding the rights to film
adaptations, and yet another controlling French translation rights. And
each of those rights can be further limited by geographical scope and
duration. So long as these licenses are exclusive, the Copyright Act
regards them as ownership interests in the underlying work.
Given this power to configure tailor-made alienable copyright
interests, some courts have suggested that a copyright holder may
partially abandon its interest.254 In dicta in Micro Star v Formgen, for
example, Judge Kozinski thought it possible that a video game
developer could abandon the rights to create and freely distribute
derivative works, while retaining the right to commercially distribute
the same.255
Other authority, however, treats the question of abandonment as

253

17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2018).
We located a single case, decided by the New Jersey Chancery Court in 1888,
that actually found a work was partially abandoned. Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J. Eq.
365, 369-70 (1888) (“This question is an open one in this state; it never before having
been presented for judicial consideration in this state…. The rule which I think
should be adopted may be stated as follows: That the owner of a dramatic or musical
composition may, like the owner of any other kind of property, do with his own as
he pleases; he may retain it for his own use and benefit, or he may give it to the
public out and out, or he may make a limited or partial dedication of it.”). Aronson
has been cited for this proposition once, in a dissent. See Kurlan v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 817 (1953) (Carter, J. dissenting).
255
Micro Star v. Formgen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Given that it
overtly encouraged players to make and freely distribute new levels, FormGen may
indeed have abandoned its exclusive right to do the same. But abandoning some
rights is not the same as abandoning all rights, and FormGen never overtly
abandoned its rights to profit commercially from new levels.”). See also Taylor
Holland LLC v. MVMT Watches Inc., No. 2:15-CV-03578-SVW-JC, 2016 WL
6892097 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (quoting MicroStar, also dicta); Malibu Media
LLC v. Doe, 381 F. Supp. 3d 343 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (leaving open possibility of
abandonment of rights to reproduce and distribute videos uploaded to tubesites)
(citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986).
But Aveco is actually a case about waiver and first sale, not abandonment)
254
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an all or nothing proposition, consistent with the doctrine’s application
to chattel property. As the Southern District of New York wrote when
a publisher alleged that Paramount had partially abandoned its rights
in Star Trek: “Defendants invite the Court to boldly go where no court
has gone before and recognize the doctrine of limited abandonment.
The Court declines the invitation… No pertinent authority has been
cited for the proposition [of limited abandonment] and the Court
knows of none.”256
Despite copyright’s generally permissive approach to the
divisibility and alienability of copyright interests, the binary approach
better serves the aims of the abandonment doctrine. Abandonment
provides a simple and clear set of rights to potential users. A work is
either abandoned, in which case all may use it; or it is not, in which
case use requires permission, absent some other applicable doctrine or
defense. Partial abandonment would inevitably result in disputes over
the precise scope of the rights abandoned, increasing information costs
and setting potential traps for unwary users.257 Abandonment should
be reserved for scenarios in which a right holder intends to relinquish
the entirety of the statutory rights in a given work.258 Efforts to grant
other forms of permission to the public should be construed as
licenses.
As this Part has highlighted, the statements and behaviors alleged
to establish an intent to abandon are manifold, and the courts’
conclusions are sometimes inconsistent and counterintuitive. But one
reasonably certain lesson we can draw from these cases is that where
256

Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1998), aff'd sub nom. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 181 F.3d
83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op.
Prods., Inc., No. C79-1766, 1981 WL 1380, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981) (“The
Court is unpersuaded by Defendants' arguments that the law recognizes or should
recognize the concept of ‘limited abandonment’ of a copyright.).
257
See Mulligan, supra note 252; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12.
258
Abandonment of jointly-authored or otherwise co-owned works presents a
potential complication. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (“authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work.”). In the event one co-owner indicates her intent
to abandon a work but the other does not, the non-abandoning owner should be
considered the sole remaining owner. Abandonment is an exercise in destroying
one’s legal rights, an option each co-owner is free to exercise. But while one coowner may destroy her own legal interest, she cannot destroy the interests of other
co-owners. Even if we consider abandonment as a transfer to the public, it is not one
that a joint owner can make unilaterally. See Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1984) (noting that a joint author cannot transfer all interest in the work without the
other co-owner's express authorization).
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a document expressly memorializes the copyright holder’s intent to
relinquish their rights, courts will acknowledge copyright
abandonment. Given the irrevocable nature of abandonment and the
risks it can present for copyright holders, we believe that a reasonably
high threshold is appropriate. But as the next Part explains, it is crucial
that rights holders who do choose to abandon their works can avail
themselves of a clear, effective, low cost mechanism for abandonment.
Just as importantly, in order to achieve the socially desirable level of
abandonment, rights holders need to understand that abandoning their
works is an option, and the law must provide incentives to optimize
the rate of abandonment.
IV. OPTIMIZING ABANDONMENT
The doctrinal opacity of copyright abandonment undermines
its potential to populate the public domain and thereby further
copyright’s core objective of creating a rich cultural and informational
commons. Instead, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, the
current state of abandonment generates three sets of problems for
copyright owners.
First, copyright owners who want to relinquish their rights face
significant information costs in terms of identifying a legally effective
mechanism for abandonment. The Copyright Act is silent. The
Copyright Office Compendium offers some guidance but disclaims
any position of the efficacy of notices of abandonment. And while
some owners use the CC0 mechanism to dedicate their works to the
public domain, no court has yet endorsed it. And even Creative
Commons expresses some degree of uncertainty about its
effectiveness. Even an exhaustive review of the case law offers no
definitive answers. A copyright holder who wants to abandon her
work to the public domain will engage in an expensive and timeconsuming search, just to be left without any certainty about how to
do so.
Second, some owners may be unwilling to abandon their works
due either to the costs associated with the practice or an inflated
assessment of the future value of their works. High-value works are
unlikely to be abandoned. But even owners of relatively low value
works may be disinclined to abandon if they overestimate their
potential to generate future revenue or if incentives to abandon are
simply insufficient to overcome the inertia of automatic protection.
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Third, many copyright holders are simply unaware that
abandonment is an option. Indeed, given the automatic nature of
protection, many are likely unaware that they are copyright holders in
the first place. Here the problem is not merely that the information is
hard to find,259 but that abandonment as a practice is so obscure that
rights holders don’t know to consider it at all.260 In the absence that
recognition, even reluctant copyright holders are not in a position to
dedicate their works to the public. As a result, abandonment remains
limited as a cultural practice.261 Since people tend to take their
behavioral cues from the conduct of similarly situated people,
copyright abandonment is likely to remain rare.
In this final Part, we consider three different types of strategies
to ameliorate these problems: legal reforms designed to illuminate a
pathway to abandonment; recalibrating owners’ incentives to
abandon; and developing informal norms that promise to make
abandonment more likely.
A. Illuminating a Pathway to Abandonment
Given the common law origins of the doctrine, courts should
make efforts to clarify the standard for copyright abandonment. In
addition to clearly and consistently distinguishing abandonment from
forfeiture, waiver, and related doctrines, courts should endorse clear
written and oral statements of intent to abandon, but otherwise
interpret purported evidence of intent narrowly. In particular, courts
should disfavor efforts to establish abandonment of copyright on the

259

These two iterations of information costs are by no means mutually exclusive.
On the contrary, if all copyright owners somehow instantly learned of the possibility
of abandoning their works, those who found the practice appealing would still face
the substantial search costs associated with effectively relinquishing rights in their
work.
260
As the poetics of Donald Rumsfeld would have it, it is an “unknown unknown”
whereas uncertainty about how to achieve abandonment is a “known unknown.”
Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Department of Defense News Briefing
(Feb.
12,
2002),
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636.
261
This is not to say that the practice is unknown or never used. As Part II illustrated,
a number of even high-value works are abandoned, particularly photographic works
and software. Even so, the number of abandoned works in relation to the total
universe of copyrighted works is vanishingly small, and the practice remains nearly
unheard of in other creative subcultures, such as [literary works?].
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basis of the physical disposition of copies. Such a rule would reduce
confusion among both rights holders and potential users.
But in light of the often slow pace of common law
development, Congress could kick start the process of clarifying
abandonment in one of three ways. At the very least, it should amend
the Copyright Act to acknowledge that rights holders are empowered
to abandon their rights and dedicate their works to the public.262 More
usefully, Congress could define a standard and associated mechanism
for abandonment, ideally one that prioritizes verbal indications of
intent.263 And as discussed below, Congress could also empower the
262

In particular, we suggest the creation of a new § 201(f) of the Copyright Act that
would entitle the owner of a copyright in a work to abandon that interest and
irretrievably place the work in the public domain.
263
One longstanding risk that could be exacerbated by a renewed interest in
abandonment is its potential to disrupt the Copyright Act’s termination of transfer
provisions. See Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off
Termination Rights, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 85, 111 (1993) (noting the potential conflict
between abandonment and termination). The Act gives authors opportunities to
rescind decades-old licenses and assignments to regain control of their works. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 203 & 304 (2018). In order to discourage termination or influence
negotiations, copyright holders could threaten to abandon the copyright in assigned
works. For economically viable works, this seems unlikely, and we know of no cases
where such strategic abuse of abandonment has occurred. But since abandonment is
an irrevocable destruction of rights that places works in the public domain, this
risk—however remote—should be addressed. One approach would forbid an
assignee from abandoning rights to a work within the statutory termination notice
windows. This reform would force assignees to give up some guaranteed period of
exclusivity and assume the risk that no termination is forthcoming, rather than
merely retaliating once a termination notice is filed.
Another approach would recognize the termination right as a future interest
and subject the abandoning owner to liability for waste. See Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 162 (1985) (labeling the post-termination interest a
“reversion”); Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 26 (2d Cir. 2015)
(calling post-termination rights a “future interest.”). But that future interest does not
vest, under current law, until the author serves the assignee with a termination notice.
Id. State real property law is inconsistent on the question of whether holders of a
contingent future interest can recover for waste. Compare Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Mars, 821 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. App. 1991) (“the existence of a vested interest in
the property, such as a remainder or a reversion, is a vital prerequisite to maintenance
of an action for waste) and Pedro v. Jan., 261 Or. 582, 596, 494 P.2d 868, 875 (1972)
(noting that “injunctive relief … has been commonly granted to contingent
remaindermen, but an assessment of damages… has been infrequent”). Once an
author serves a notice, it seems, she would be able to seek an injunction to prevent
abandonment or recover the value of the work from the abandoning assignee. Prior
to serving notice, her position is less certain.
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Copyright Office to define a standard and administer a process for
recording copyright abandonments.264
At the administrative level, a number of reforms could reduce
the information costs complicating copyright abandonment.
Empowered by Congress, the Copyright Office could develop a robust
administrative mechanism for evaluating, recording, and publicizing
copyright abandonment.265 Today, notices of abandonment are filed
using the standard recordation form, just like any other transfer. And
the Office disclaims any statement as to the legal effect of such a
filing. Instead, the Copyright Office could promulgate a form
specifically for abandonment, one that complies with a legal standard
articulated clarified by the courts or endorsed by Congress. While the
Office’s determinations of abandonment—like its registration

264

Some jurisdictions provide clear statutory copyright abandonment procedures.
For example, Section 21 of Indian Copyright Act provides:
(1) The author of a work may relinquish all or any of the rights comprised in
the copyright in the work by giving notice in the prescribed form to the
Registrar of Copyrights or by way of public notice and thereupon such rights
shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), cease to exist from the date
of the notice.
(2) On receipt of a notice under sub-section (1), the Registrar of Copyrights
shall cause it to be published in the Official Gazette and in such other manner
as he may deem fit.
(2A) The Registrar of Copyrights shall, within fourteen days from the
publication of the notice in the Official Gazette, post the notice on the official
website of the Copyright Office so as to remain in the public domain for a
period of not less than three years.
(3) The relinquishment of all or any of the rights comprised in the copyright in
a work shall not affect any rights subsisting in favour of any person on the date
of the notice referred to in sub-section (1).

For a detailed survey of international copyright abandonment regimes, see
Guadamuz, supra note 3.
265
The scope of the Copyright Office’s existing authority over such rules is
uncertain. The most relevant, explicit statutory authority the Office could claim
provides that “Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to
a copyright may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the document filed for
recordation bears the actual signature of the person who executed it, or if it is
accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy of the original,
signed document.” 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (2018). Even if this language is sufficient to
support an effort by the Office to develop more robust procedures for abandonment,
given the importance of the question, we think Congress owes the Office some
measure of additional guidance.
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decisions—would not be dispositive, they fall squarely within the
Office’s expertise and would be entitled to judicial deference.266
Crucially, the Office should not charge a fee for filing a notice
of abandonment. Currently, the standard fee of $105 for recordation
applies. This creates a paradoxical scenario in which obtaining a
copyright is free, while ridding yourself of one is costly. Ideally, the
abandonment forms would be made available through a simple online
interface, allowing owners to dedicate their works easily and quickly,
with appropriate safeguards to prevent fraudulent notices.267
These filings could in turn populate a searchable registry of
abandoned works. Users could locate public domain works by title,
type of work, author, owner, date of vesting, and date of abandonment.
The Office could even make copies of abandoned works available for
download.268 Today, the Office provides no simple way to identify
works that have been abandoned, defeating the purpose of
abandonment from the perspective of potential users.
These proposals operate against a backdrop of considerable
private efforts to reduce the transaction costs of abandonment.
Millions of works have been distributed under the terms of CC0 and
similar instruments. As a third step, the law—whether through
Congress, courts, or the Copyright Office—should clarify the public
domain status of works subject to such private dedication
instruments.269 Although a clear, legally-recognized administrative
mechanism for abandonment would prove valuable, we do not intend
that process to function as an exclusive means of abandonment. The
choice to rely on a private instrument like CC0 or an individually266

See generally Aaron Perzanowski, The Limits of Copyright Office Expertise, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733 (2018).
267
Unlike other property records, which could be manipulated to falsely indicate
ownership of an asset, the abandoned works registry does not purport to create
exclusive rights. As a result, the incentives to falsify abandonment records would be
low. Nonetheless, we recommend requiring any such abandonment be accompanied
by a statement, under penalty of perjury, that the filer has a good faith belief that
they own the work in question.
268
User-friendly design has not been a hallmark of the Copyright Office’s internet
presence historically. But the Office has dedicated significant resources to its digital
transition in recent years. And given the Office’s status as a division of the Library
of Congress, which regularly provides public domain collections to the public, such
a system should be achievable.
269
The Library of Congress, which houses the Copyright Office, relies on CC0 when
it chooses to make its own works available for public use. See Legal, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/legal/#copyright.
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crafted statement of abandonment, rather than a federal form, should
not preclude abandonment. However, we would expect over time that
either the existing CC0 instrument would be recognized as a valid
abandonment, or that it would evolve, if necessary, to satisfy whatever
federal standard emerged. If so, owners could include the CC0
designation on abandoned works to signal their public domain status,
providing a quick way for users to determine whether a work’s
copyright status.270
Private organizations like Creative Commons or the Internet
Archive might be better positioned to host and operate a database of
abandoned works, particularly since those entities could more easily
include works abandoned through private mechanisms in addition to
those filed with the Copyright Office.271 Ideally, at least one complete
and authoritative registry would allow the public to search for
abandoned works.
These reforms would provide a clear signal to owners about
how to abandon their copyrights, one backed by the authority of law.
And by providing that information online and in easily accessible
form, they would help users access public domain resources. Related,
these moves would channel abandonment to a handful of approved
mechanisms by either prompting an official and effective Copyright
Office form or endorsing existing instruments like CC0. So while the
current legal landscape consists of a confusing multiplicity of ways to
potentially relinquish one’s rights in a work of authorship, these
reforms would reduce owners’ decision costs and promote
abandonment generally.
B. Recalibrating Incentives
Formalizing and streamlining pathways to memorialize and
publicize abandonment promises to reduce confusion and transaction
costs. This clarifies the route to abandonment for owners who are
inclined to relinquish their copyrights. It does not, however, do
anything to allay the error costs that might deter an owner from
270

Other scholars have argued that the Copyright Office should create a public
domain indication along the lines of the familiar “©” symbol. See Asay, supra note
104 at 802 (arguing for a “PD” mark to indicate public domain status). In order to
make information costs as low as possible, we think the best strategy would be to
adopt current usage signaling public domain status, hence our suggestion that the
Copyright Office embrace “CC0” as a signaling device.
271
CC0 is machine readable, like the Creative Commons suite of licenses,
facilitating searchability. CC0, https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/CC0.
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relinquishing rights to their work when it is essentially costless to them
yet beneficial to the public. We thus consider two types of strategies
designed to bend the incentives of these owners toward abandonment:
carrots (positive incentives) and sticks (negative penalties).
1. Carrots
Tax incentives. One approach to altering the cost calculus in
favor of abandonment would be to leverage the tax system to provide
rights holders marginal economic incentives to part with their works.
Existing tax law countenances donations of intellectual property,
including copyrighted works, to charitable organizations and branches
of state and federal government.272 For example, Irving Berlin donated
his interest in “God Bless America” to a trust that supports the Boy
Scouts and Girl Scouts.273 As noted above, Carol Highsmith has
donated more than 50,000 images to the Library of Congress on a
copyright-free basis.274 The Library has also elected to make other
works in its collections available for unrestricted public use.275 But
nothing requires that works donated to the Library of Congress, or any
other government entity, be dedicated to the public domain.276
Likewise, the donation of works to a non-profit organization
need not result in abandonment. Those contributions are merely
assignments—transfers of copyright ownership from one party to
another. In both cases, abandonment would require some further
evidence of an intent to eliminate the copyright, either by the donor at
the time of transfer or by the donee organization after the fact. Whether
donated to the Library of Congress, an existing organization like
Creative Commons or the Internet Archive, or to a newly formed non272

26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2018). (defining “charitable contribution” to include a gift to
“A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the
foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the
contribution or gift is made for exclusively public purposes.”
273
William Glaberson, Irving Berlin Gave the Scouts A Gift of Song, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/14/us/irving-berlin-gave-thescouts-a-gift-of-song.html.
274
See supra note 56. Highsmith’s initial gift to the Library included a number of
transparencies, negatives, and prints, but in the same document she “dedicate[d] to
the public all rights, including copyrights, throughout the world … in this
collection.” Id. at Exhibit I.
275
See supra note 113.
276
The government can own copyrights assigned by non-governmental authors. 17
U.S.C. § 105 (2018).
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profit that committed to dedicating works to the public domain, such
works could qualify as charitable contributions.277
But the current tax treatment of copyrighted works provides
little incentive for owners to part with them. The Internal Revenue
Code distinguishes between two types of copyrighted works for the
purposes of charitable deductions: those donated by their creators and
those donated by non-creators. Since 1969, if the creator of a work
donates it, they are not entitled to deduct its fair market value, but only.
out of pocket expenses associated with the work that have not been
previously deducted.278 In many cases, that translates to no deduction
whatsoever.279 In contrast, works donated by someone other than their
creators were deductible historically at fair market value.280 But in
2004, Congress tightened the rules for donations of intellectual
property amid concerns about patent valuation abuses.281 Under the
new rules, the donor’s tax deduction is the lesser of asset’s fair market
value or its tax basis. Typically, that tax basis is very small, and again,
in many cases it is zero.282
More generous deducibility could yield an increase in
abandonment. But it may sacrifice significant federal revenue in the
process. The IRS discourages large-scale fraud by requiring a
qualified appraisal for any charitable deductions over $5000.283 But
277

Martin Skladany has offered a similar proposal to encourage the dissemination
newly-designated public domain works. MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT
VERSUS THE PEOPLE (2018).
278
Charitable contributions of creators are governed by the general rule in 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(e)(1)(A). Income from their sale is not considered a capital asset, so the value
is reduced by any gain from a hypothetical sale. Id. § 1221(a)(3).
279
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1721 (2006).
280
Id.
281
See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, S. 6457, 108th Cong.
(2003) (noting “widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar
property”).
282
Nguyen & Maine, supra note 279. Deductions arising from such donations must
be reduced by any long-term capital gains. 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii). To partially
address the disincentive created by these harsher rules, Congress provided for future
deductions, over a 12-year phase-out period, based on any revenue derived by the
donee from the gift. Id. § 170(m)(3). This provision does little to encourage
copyright abandonment.
283
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 561, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF
DONATED PROPERTY 8-9 (2017). In addition, for items valued at $50,000 or more,
the IRS Art Advisory Panel provides an additional layer of scrutiny. INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL 4.48.2.
66

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

$1000 or $100 deductions for abandoned photos, emails, and mediocre
poetry could add up. Conversely, there’s a risk that given the recent
increase in the standard deduction, itemizing low dollar value
donations of works might insufficiently incentivize individual
copyright holders. Finally, attaching a monetary benefit to an
otherwise altruistic act like donating a work to the public may actually
dissuade would-be abandoners by framing the act in terms of financial
self-interest rather than concern for others.284
Cash incentives. A simpler approach would offer copyright
holders modest cash payments to abandon. If, rather than charging
rights holders $105 to file a notice of abandonment, the Copyright
Office gave abandoning rights holders $10 per work, we would expect
to see a considerable increase in abandonment.
But this approach faces its own set of challenges. First,
calibrating payments to induce the optimal levels of abandonment
would be no easy task. A payment of $1000 per work would
undoubtedly enrich the public domain, but may lead many songwriters
or photographers to abandon works with considerable commercial
potential. Second, cash payments increase the risk of gaming the
system. Even at $10 each, a dedicated, if unskilled, poet could make a
tidy sum producing soon-to-be-abandoned works. An annual or
lifetime cap on payments could mitigate some of that risk. But more
generally, a cash-based abandonment incentive could prove massively
expensive given the number of unwanted copyrighted works produced
each year. Justifying that expense in light of other demands on the
federal budget would be difficult.
Of course, there is nothing preventing a private entity from
investing its resources in enriching the public domain. The Arcadia
Fund, for example, has made an $850,000 grant to MIT Press to
support open access monographs.285 Perhaps public domain
dedication would prove an even more attractive investment. Even forprofit corporations may have some incentive to foot the bill for
abandonment, although they are more likely to prefer exclusive
licenses to abandonment.

284

See Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 139598 (2018) (citing literature showing that self-interest and altruism tend to compete
directly with each other, and that the former tends to predominate).
285
MIT Press, The MIT Press Receives a Generous Grant from the Arcadia Fund to
Develop and Pilot a Sustainable Framework for Open Access Monographs, Oct. 3,
2019,
https://mitpress.mit.edu/blog/mit-press-receives-generous-grant-arcadiafund-develop-and-pilot-sustainable-framework-open.
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Golden swan insurance. In Part II, we discussed “golden
swans”—works that generate substantial and unexpected value late in
the copyright term—and authors’ fears of parting with such works in
light of the costlessness of owning a copyright. The golden swan
problem is a matter of risk assessment clouded by optimism bias. But
insurance may furnish a solution.
Consider a system that promised any owner who abandoned
their work compensation if that work earned significant revenue either
through being republished or incorporated into a derivative work.
Such a system should be funded and managed by a federal agency,
like the Copyright Office, since private funding would prove
infeasible. Given that the public receives the benefit of abandonment,
public funding makes some measure of sense even if securing
significant federal dollars for golden swan insurance is unlikely. Aside
from that budgetary hurdle, the chief practical challenges of such a
system would be accounting for the profit earned by a given work and
administering payouts. One partial solution would be to keep the
compensation structure as simple as possible. The policy could give
donors of abandoned works a set rate (e.g., $10,000) if their abandoned
work earns gross revenue286 in excess of some threshold (e.g.,
$100,000).287 This may undercompensate owners whose works
become true blockbusters. But such outcomes are vanishingly rare.
The aim of the policy is less to ensure full compensation and more to
assuage owners’ hesitance to abandon a potential golden swan. The
mere possibility of compensation may suffice to overcome owners’
optimism bias.288

286

Abandoned works are in the public domain, but they may still be used to create
revenue, such as by creating valuable derivative works.
287
Admittedly, determining the contribution of a particular work to revenues
generated by a derivative work presents a more complex challenge.
288
A rough analogy is FEMA flood insurance. The federal government offers
residents of homes in designated high-risk areas low-cost insurance to compensate
them for damage in the event of a flood. The policies do not promise full
compensation, but only reimbursement up to a cap well below the property’s value.
They thus function as an enticement to offset concerns about possible lowprobability, high-impact risks. But unlike FEMA flood insurance, golden swan
policies would have vanishingly small payout risks. And the behavior they
incentivize is socially beneficial (dedicating works to the public domain) as opposed
to socially harmful (building homes likely to contribute to increased environmental
damage). See Bonnie Kristian, The perverse incentives of the National Flood
Insurance
Program,
THE
WEEK,
Aug.
29,
2017,
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2. Sticks
If retaining low-value copyrights is socially harmful, the
copyright system could impose costs on rights holders to encourage
abandonment. Most forms of intellectual property require some
payment or action in order to maintain rights. The failure to pay
maintenance fees, ranging as high as $7400, results in the loss of
patent rights.289 Trademark owners must use their marks in commerce
and renew their registrations.290 And trade secret owners must make
reasonable—and often costly—efforts to maintain their secrets.
But copyright has parted from its cognate fields. Copyright
holders bear no costs to maintain ownership. In large part, this reflects
compliance with international obligations. The Berne Convention
requires that “the enjoyment and exercise” of copyrights “shall not be
subject to any formality.”291 Requiring that authors take any
affirmative action to renew their copyrights represents an archetypal
violation of Berne.292
Scholars have offered a number of proposals to address the
downsides of formality-free copyright.293 Larry Lessig proposed the
Public Domain Enhancement Act, which would have required owners
to pay a $1 fee fifty years after a work’s first publication, and again
every ten years until expiration.294 In a different vein, Richard Posner
and Bill Landes have advocated for indefinite copyrights, subject to

https://theweek.com/articles/721185/perverse-incentives-national-flood-insuranceprogram.
289
15
U.S.C.
§
1127;
USPTO,
Maintain
Your
Patent,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent.
290
15 U.S.C. § 1059, USPTO, Overview of Trademark Fees,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/fees-payment-information/overview-trademarkfees.
291
Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works art. 5 (1971).
292
293

See, e.g., Chris Sprigman, supra note 91 at 545-67 (outlining policy options to
counter challenges arising in the wake of eradication of copyright formalities).
294
H.R. 2408 (109th Congress, 2005). The PDEA was twice proposed in the U.S.
House of Representatives; it died in committee both times. The proposal attempted
to avoid the Berne problem by limiting its application to works first published in the
United States. This would reduce the effective scope of the legislation but would
save it from violating Berne, which adopts a national treatment principle: Nations
may disadvantage their own copyrights, though they cannot do so to foreign ones.
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an ongoing obligation to renew.295 Although these proposals reinstate
formal requirements that could shift the calculus in favor of
abandonment, they would also increase the rate of forfeiture through
unintentional failures to comply.
To remain compliant with the Berne Convention and focus
exclusively on abandonment, consider this alternative: Owners of
registered works would owe a tax of $100 per year on each work
starting in the fifteenth year of the copyright term. This tax would not
be paired with automatic forfeiture of copyright. It would be penalized
instead by the standard IRS rules for nonpayment of taxes. In this case,
Berne presents no obstacle because enjoyment and exercise of the
copyright is not contingent on payment of a fee or compliance with a
formality.
This approach obviously represents a much lighter-touch
intervention than the other sticks discussed above. Some owners of
registered works—especially high-value works that are earning
substantial revenue—will find $100/year a fully justified cost in
relation to their royalty income. Wealthy owners may regard the
amount as trivial regardless of the value of their work. But for authors
of works that are no longer producing income, it will force them to
consider abandonment. In this sense, it operates as a “nudge” in the
now-familiar phrasing of Sunstein and Thaler. This tax proposal does
not coerce, and it will not affect the conduct of most owners. But at
the margins, it will encourage owners to weigh abandonment as an
option.
C. Availability and Abandonment as a Social Practice
Optimizing abandonment also requires thinking about it not
only as a doctrine but also as a social practice. One explanation for the
rarity of abandonment is its absence from the copyright lexicon.296

295

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). The Landes and Posner proposal flies in the face of the
Constitution’s mandate that Congress may create copyrights only for “limited
times.” U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Posner and Landes foresaw this objection, and
argued that the constitutional meaning of “limited times” is unclear and that any
renewal short of infinity is limited. Landes & Posner, supra note 295 Id. at 472-73.
296
Two types of works—software and photography—are abandoned with higher
frequency than others. We believe this behavior suggests a desire for abandonment
that could be better facilitated by law reform. It also suggests the potential for
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Copyrights owners know that they may transfer, license, and
sublicense their works, or hang onto them for life and devise them as
part of their estate. The Copyright Act contains a detailed statutory
scheme governing all these options, but it nowhere so much as uses
the term “abandonment.”297 Scholarly texts that otherwise
exhaustively canvass the entirety of copyright pay scant attention to
abandonment, often referring briefly to the doctrine only as a defense
to infringement, not as an affirmative strategy owners may wish to
undertake.298 A major part of the challenge, then, is centering
abandonment as a practice that owners may choose to pursue.
In short, abandonment has an availability problem. Among the
major cognitive biases that behavioralists have shown to distort our
thinking is availability. When a phenomenon is especially salient, we
are inclined to overestimate its likelihood.299 For example, people tend
to avoid the beach after highly publicized shark attacks, even though
the likelihood of shark attacks is no greater due to a single wellpublicized incident.300 By the same token, where a given phenomenon
is not immediately familiar, people may wrongly assume that it is
generally unavailable. For example, if you live in a tech-savvy city
like San Francisco, you are unlikely to know anyone who lacks an
internet connection, and are thus much more likely to overstate the
national prevalence of internet connectivity.301 For similar reasons,
copyright holders may fail to abandon their copyrights, even when
doing so suits their needs, simply because abandonment’s obscurity
renders it unavailable as a social practice.

emergent trends in favor of abandonment in other creative communities, among
authors and filmmakers for example, where the practice is far less prevalent.
297
17 U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (defining ownership, outlining scheme for transfer and
termination of transfer, and establishing means to record copyright-related
transactions).
298
E.g., Joyce et al. (10th ed. 2018).
299
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky, eds., 1982) (outlining the nature
of the availability heuristic).
300
This is an example of what Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein have termed an
“availability error”: Behavior that is suboptimal because of an excess of availability.
See Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 703-15 (1999).
301
See Jamie Madigan, The Availability Heuristic Is Always On, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Apr. 15, 2013 (discussing this example).

71

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543654

Neither courts, nor Congress, nor the Copyright Office have
the power to immediately render abandonment salient in the minds of
owners. That said, the strategies we suggest in this Part may help to
ameliorate abandonment’s availability problem. Simply providing a
visible pathway to abandoning works will serve to highlight the
practice as one that owners may choose, alongside transfer and
licensing.302 This pathway may serve as a focal point around which
the social practice of abandonment may coalesce. As a number of
studies have shown, behaviors are much more likely to emerge when
there is some pattern or framework to guide and encourage their
development.303 Independently, incentivizing abandonment, either via
carrot or stick, could send a message about the desirability of
abandonment. The work of private organizations like Creative
Commons has been, and will continue to be, crucially important in
increasing the availability and ease of abandonment, and in creating a
culture in which it is celebrated. Together, these twin forces could help
to bring abandonment out of the shadows and make it an available,
and likely more generally used, social practice for copyright owners.
CONCLUSION
One might look at the near-absence of scholarly attention to
copyright abandonment as an indication that the doctrine is of little
consequence. This Article has dispelled that misapprehension. By
situating copyright abandonment within the broader resurgence of
interest in abandonment generally, we have offered a competing
theory of abandonment as a relinquishment of rights that reconciles
apparent contradictions within the unilateral transfer approach. We
have also highlighted the significant stakes of the doctrine, for
individual authors and the public writ large, by exploring both the
economic calculus and the counterintuitive reality of copyright
abandonment. But as our detailed canvassing of the positive law of
copyright abandonment reveals, the doctrine is fractured and the
302

Cf. Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, 1415 (2010) (showing that visible phenomena are more available and thus more likely
to affect decisions), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1583509.
303
The seminal work on how behavior coalesces around focal points is Thomas
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960). Schelling showed that conduct naturally
coalesces around locations and behaviors that are socially salient, famously
illustrated by his experiment in which New Yorkers successfully met each other
even without a given date or time because they all familiarly assumed to do so at
noon at Grand Central Station.
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mechanism for effective abandonment remains uncertain. Optimizing
abandonment demands, at the very least, clear and reliable legal and
administrative pathways. Beyond that, encouraging prosocial
abandonment of copyright may require shifting rights holder
incentives and, more promisingly, the development of social practices
that value the public domain and copyright’s constitutional
aspirations.
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